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“When we gazed upon all this splendour at once, we scarcely knew what to think, and we
doubted whether all that we beheld was real. A series of large towns stretched themselves
along the banks of the lake, out of which still larger ones rose magnificently above the
waters. Innumerable crowds of canoes were plying everywhere around us; at regular
distances we continually passed over new bridges, and before us lay the great city of
Mexico in all its splendour.”
– Bernal Diaz del Castillo, Memoirs of the Conquistador Bernal Diaz del Castillo

“He [Hernán Cortés] said to them[Cuauhtémoc and his nobles]: “What of the Gold? That
which was guarded in Mexico?”
– Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, Book XII

“We wander here and there
in our desolate poverty.
We are mortal men.
We have seen bloodshed and pain
where once we saw beauty and valor.”
– Unknown Author, “Flowers and Songs of Sorrow,” The Broken Spears
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Pronunciation Guide

Vowels:
a as “ah” in far
e as “ay” in ace
i as “ee” in deep
o as “oh” in tote
u as “oo” in rule
Consonants that are not pronounced the same as in English:
x as “sh” in shell
z as “s” in suit
hu as “w” in waste or weed
ll as in fully
que, qui as “kay” or “kee” in case or keep
cu as “kw” in quasar, query
tl as in Tlingit (soft emphasis on the l)
tz as in pretzel1
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Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in the Aztec World (Oxford: University
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Preface

When talking about the Conquest of Mexico there are certain terms and names
that are incorrectly used. For example, there was never an “Aztec Empire”; the term
Aztec is a modern derivation of Aztlan, the mythical homeland of the Mexica, the ethnic
group commonly referred to as the Aztecs. Aztec can also refer to the people in and
around the Valley of Mexico because they share the language Nahuatl and many of the
same gods. However, I prefer to use the term Nahuas for these people due to their
linguistic kinship. The peoples of Mesoamerica commonly referred to themselves by
their ethnic group, such as Mexica, Alcohua, Tepanec, etc., or by their city-states, such as
Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, Tlacopan, etc. The three ethnic groups and cities mentioned are
the people who constituted the Triple Alliance. The Triple Alliance’s conquests resulted
in what is referred to as the Aztec Empire. The Mexica of Tenochtitlan were the
predominant ethnic group in the Alliance and their tlatoani, essentially a king, became
the de facto leader among the Empire.2 See map 2.
There has been debate whether or not the Triple Alliance actually constituted
what is in the Western view an “empire.” The Triple Alliances’ power was that of an
indirect empire; it was created by conquering other city-states, who acknowledged the
Alliance’s dominance in the form of paying tribute. The Alliance had a loose control
over conquered city-states, and low cost management because they did not have an
extensive bureaucracy. The Alliance’s empire is often compared to that of Athens’
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Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 4.
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during its classical period.3 Furthermore, towards the end of the Empire, it was
increasingly bureaucratized in order to deal with logistical problems of the Empire’s size,
which unprecedented in Mesoamerica. Part of this process of bureaucratizing was the
dividing the conquered city-states into thirty-eight tributary provinces, centered around
the dominant city-state in ethnic enclaves. This process involved record keeping and the
appointing of meritocratic nobles to supervise the flow of tribute.4 It is tempting to
speculate how the Empire would have continued to develop if Hernán Cortés had not
truncated its growth.
The Triple Alliance’s Empire encompassed a large area of what is called
Mesoamerica. Mesoamerica is less of a geographical distinction, but rather an area that
constituted peoples of similar cultural beliefs and attitudes when compared to other
regions of the Americas. Mesoamerica is geographically diverse and spans all of modern
day Mexico and even to parts of Costa Rica. See map 1. The Alliance’s Empire spanned
many ecological ranges; it controlled areas on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean.
The climates ranged from the tropical lowlands to those of the Valley of Mexico high in
the central Mexican plateau. Land along the Gulf of Mexico and the other areas below
1,000m in elevation are considered the tropical lowlands. The land between 1,0002,000m in elevation is considered the Mesoamerican highlands, and finally the central
Mexican plateau, which is all the land above 2,000 m in elevation.5
The Valley of Mexico is situated in the mountainous central plateau. A mix of
mountain ridges and semi-dormant volcanoes cradles the Valley; these features created
3

Smith, Aztecs, 173-4.
Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control, (Norman:
University of Oklahoma, 1995), 261-3.
5
Smith, Aztecs, 6-7.
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an internally drained continuous lake system. The Lakes Zumpango and Xaltocan were
the northern most and their lower elevation made them brackish; conversely, the southern
most lakes, Xochimilco and Chalco were higher in elevation and were fresh water. Lake
Texcoco, in the middle, was moderately brackish. The Mexica founded Tenochtitlan,
their city-state, on an island on the western side of Lake Texcoco. The lakes themselves
provided abundant natural food sources, and the Valley itself had rich fertile soil from the
erosion and run off of the surrounding mountains and volcanoes. Beyond having
incredible potential for agriculture, the Valley is located near two obsidian sources,
Otumba and Pachuca. Pachuca obsidian was the highest quality and had a green hue
making it the most appealing variety of obsidian to the Valley’s various inhabitants.6 The
importance of obsidian to the development of Mexica’s culture was nearly as great as it’s
abundant agricultural resources.

6

Smith, Aztecs, 8-11.
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Introduction

The Conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés is often written and examined from
the view of the European victors. This approach inevitably minimizes the actions and
roles of the majority of the people involved, the Mesoamericans themselves. The lines of
the conflict have traditionally been drawn as the Spaniards versus the Triple Alliance,
commonly known as the Aztecs. In reality, the Spaniards, with the aid and complicity of
dozens of native city-states, were able in the end to conquer the Alliance of the Mexica of
Tenochtitlan, the Alcohua of Texcoco, and the Tepanecs of Tlacopan. In addition this
conquest has often been simplified as a conquest in which European technology and
disease trumped the Amerindians’ stone weaponry and lack of immunity.
The above explanations, however, have begun to change with the addition of a
more recent view that the Spaniards with the guile of Hernán Cortés were able to take
advantage of the internal dissatisfaction within the Triple Alliance’s Empire. As
anthropologists Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest phrase it, the Triple Alliances’
“loosely knit empire flew to pieces” as the tributary states sided with or directly aided
Hernán Cortés. Nonetheless, the deathblow to the Triple Alliance is still commonly seen
as the result of smallpox that allowed Cortés to swoop in and claim victory.
Because of these views, the Conquest is often seen as the inevitability of
European dominance of technological and societal advancements along with the impact
of disease. This view of inevitability of indigenous defeat is epitomized in Jared
Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel. His work sets out to explore and understand why it
was the Europeans who were the dominant world powers, and not some other civilization
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from another continent. His argument is not based on race but geography and the
environment as an attempt to trace the root causes of European success and why
civilizations developed the ways that they did. The focus of his work is to explore and
better understand why history unfolded “differently on different continents,” and what
factors made European states the initial world powers and why this dominance did not
originate elsewhere. Diamond’s argument is essentially that environmental factors such
as, the large size of Eurasia, the larger number of wild plants and animals, and the
horizontal axis of Eurasia leading to similar climatic zones – were stacked in favor of
Eurasian advancement. He views the collapse of the Triple Alliance as the combination
disease, and the “overwhelming military superiority” of the Spaniards along with their
“political skills at exploiting divisions within the native population, did the rest.”7 Put
simply, Jared Diamond argues that Eurasian success was an inevitability that derived
from environmental determinism, which was slanted in Eurasians’ favor. This advantage,
ultimately, culminated in societies with advanced technology and fortuitous early
exposure to diseases, which societies on other continents did not have.
Jared Diamond identifies the environment as the predominant and determining
factor in European conquests and subsequent colonization. He avoids cultural factors
impacting history, and thereby, pushes human agency aside. Historian Joachim Radkau
warns against placing too strong an emphasis on the environment, writing, “A history of
human environmental awareness cannot be written as the history of a sense of nature’s
right to exist on its own terms, but only as the history of a coevolution of a culture and
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Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 9, 373.
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nature.”8 Nature must be understood as not only as a force that shapes human
development but is also in turn shaped by that development. Man and nature’s
coevolution have been and will continue to be inextricably connected and influenced by
one another.
Radkau admonishes Crosby, an earlier proponent of environmental determinism,
stating that “when he describes the victory and defeat of ecosystems, what he presents is
a substantially constructed history, one which assumes that the Old World and the New
World exist as more or less compact, large-scale ecosystems above all ecotopes and
ecological niches.”9 Diamond also views continents as “more or less compact
ecosystems” and follows in Crosby’s footsteps. This is evident in Diamond’s view of the
importance of Eurasia’s horizontal axis contributing to the spread of farming, which gave
a “head start” in Eurasian societies. However, Diamond’s biggest flaw in his argument is
that he focuses only on what sets Eurasia apart and how it developed from its advantages.
From there he assumes that because the other continents lack these features, the success
of Europeans in conquest was inevitable. His argument, because of its scale, lacks the
finesse of actually examining on an individual basis the ways that the non-Western
societies developed from the environment in which they existed. Furthermore, his
argument removes culture as a contributing factor to a society’s advancement.
Anthropologist Heather Lechtman has made invaluable contributions to the
understanding of the ways that culture affects technology. Her focus specifically on
Andean metallurgy has provided important insights into both understanding the

8

Joachim Radkau, Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment, trans.
Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5.
9
Ibid., 158.
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metallurgy of Mesoamerica as well as its astounding lithic technologies. Lechtman
argues that technological style (style being the “manifest expression, on the behavioral
level of cultural patterning,” and technological style is one of the ways a culture is
physically expressed) is “rarely if ever dictated solely by the environment.”
Technological style reflects cultural choices more than it does an environment because
the environment is a set of “immutable conditions” that a culture is structured around.10
Meaning that while the environment shapes culture, technology is, ultimately, a reflection
of the culture that made it.
Geography, climate, flora, and fauna constitute the ecosystems and the
environments in which human societies develop; however, human culture affects the
ways in which societies interact with their environment. Part of this work will explore
the ways that the environment of Mesoamerica impacted the development of
Mesoamericans, and specifically on the Mexica and the Triple Alliance. I will explore
why the Triple Alliance developed into, arguably, the most advanced lithic society, and
why metallurgy was largely reserved for religious and status items.
There are three known factors that contribute to the development of advanced
metallurgy, that is metallurgy of bronze, iron, and steel: warfare, wheeled transport, and
agriculture.11 Therefore, to understand Mesoamerica’s technological development I will
need to examine the ways that Mesoamerica’s agriculture developed and how it differed
from Eurasia’s. I will also examine how abundant deposits of high quality obsidian
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Heather Lechtman, “Style in Technology – Some Early Thoughts,” in Material
Culture: Styles, Organization, and Dynamics of Technology, ed. Heather Lechtman and
Robert S. Merrill (New York: West Publishing Co., 1977), 5-6, 14-5.
11
Heather Lechtman, “Andean Value Systems and the Development of Prehistoric
Metallurgy” Technology and Culture, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1984): 1, www.jstor.org.
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developed a culture and society focused on lithic technology whose physical and
aesthetic attributes filled the roles metallurgy would have. The difference in agriculture
led to a different style of farming and this was also influenced by the lack of large
domesticated animals. Both of these factors, as I will show, hindered an impetus to
develop advanced metallurgy. In addition, I will show how the cultural attitudes towards
obsidian along with its unique abundance and physical qualities, too, hindered the
development of advanced metallurgy.
Finally, I will examine how the Conquest of Mexico actually unfolded. One
assumption is Cortés’ use of indigenous animosity towards the Triple Alliance, especially
of the Tlaxcalans. Yet the alliances Cortés formed, aside from that with the Tlaxcalans,
were often tenuous and based on a display of power or rather as a means to avoid Cortés’
wrath. 12 Furthermore, Cortés was nowhere near as cunning as he is given credit for.
Disease’s role was by no means clear since the overwhelming majority of Cortés’ army,
and even logistics, depended on Amerindians who were just as vulnerable to smallpox as
were those of the Triple Alliance. Technology, too, played an ambiguous role in the
Conquest. Cortés certainly had superior weapons and technology, but it was the
contrasting view of warfare stemming from cultural attitudes towards war that aided
Cortés the most. Finally, I will show that it is perhaps the Tlaxcalans’ unwavering
anathema towards the Mexica combined with a continuous chain of cultural
misunderstandings that aided Cortés the most.

12

Hassig, Aztec Warfare, 246-9.
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Chapter One
From Aztlan to Tenochtitlan
“And they placed their trust in Uitzilopochtli.” – Florentine Codex13
To understand the effects of environmental and cultural factors on the Conquest
of the Triple Alliance by Cortés, one must first examine the ways in which the Alliance
came into power in 1428 CE. As the Mexica ethnic group, commonly known today as
Aztecs, was the principle leader of the alliance this chapter, like much of this work, will
focus on them. The Mexica entered the Valley of Mexico in 1325 CE as a minor, semibarbarous ethnic group from the larger Chichimec peoples of Northwestern Mexico. See
map 3. Within a hundred years they would supplant dominant powers of the Valley and
begin ruthless conquests and consolidations of power until contact with Cortés. The
Mexica became the de facto power of the Triple Alliance and over many conquered
peoples. This was achieved by restructuring their religion and society; they glorified
their own tribal god to a new position that could only be satiated by the hearts of enemies
captured in war. The Mexica created a political system built on religion that was fueled
by warfare; however, these changes were built on already existing cultural norms. This
chapter will examine the general history of the Valley of Mexico, the ways in which the
Mexica took power, the societal restructuring after they took power, the ways in which
the empire was created, and how it maintained unstable control.
The religious, societal, and organizational changes of Mexica society had
dramatic effects on the expansion of their empire but also contributed to its collapse by
13

Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of New
Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble (Santa Fe: The School of
American Research and The University of Utah Monographs of the School of American
Research, 1975), III: 5.
15

Cortés’ forces. Montezuma Xocoyotzin, the tlatoani (king) in power at the time of
Cortés arrival, had been trying to consolidate and stabilize the Mexica Empire
immediately prior to contact, and those efforts will also be discussed.
The supra-ethnic group known as the Chichimecs began migrating into the Valley
of Mexico from just outside its north/northwest mountain range sometime after 900 CE.
They mixed with the remnant Teotihuaca people whose dominant empire had suddenly
collapsed around 750 CE for unknown reasons. The subsequent mixing of people
revitalized the area that the Teotihuacan had ruled over, and together the mixed groups
formed the Toltecs. The Toltec state lasted from around 950 to 1200 CE. They began to
fragment as new waves of Chichimec peoples flooded into the valley. Remnant Toltec
cities were the sources of legitimating heritages because the Toltecs were considered
civilized while Chichimecs were considered barbarous. If a city-state wanted to establish
itself it needed a link to the Toltecs to legitimize themselves.14
Between 1200 CE, around the end of the Toltec civilization, and 1500 CE, the
population of the Valley of Mexico increased eightfold from approximately 200,000 to
over 1.6 million. Population doubled every century from a combination of population
growth and migrations into the valley by Chichimec groups.15 The Mexica claimed that
they were the last of the seven Chichimec tribes to leave their mystical home of Aztlan
and enter the Mexican Valley. Although Aztlan is likely a fantasy it is true that the
Mexica were latecomers in the valley. Most of the fertile land was had been inhabited;
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Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of
the Aztec and the Inca Expansion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13-9.
15
Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America: Archaeology and Culture
History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 438-9.
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the Mexica were forced to settle on the swampy island on the near the western shores of
Lake Texcoco.16
Despite being on an island, Tenochtitlan was founded in 1325 CE at the
confluence of three city-states, meaning that their subjugation was likely inevitable. The
city was divided into quadrants due to the religious importance of the cardinal directions.
Each section was controlled by a calpulli, essentially a kinship group with its own
internal stratifications ranging from commoners to an elected leader, and was allowed to
develop as it so pleased.1718 Soon after the founding, the Mexica were subjugated by the
Tepanecs, an ethnic group ruling from Azcapotzalco, the capital of the Tepanec Empire,
on the western shores of Lake Texcoco. Undeterred, the intrepid Mexica went to work
building their city, draining the swampy island, and creating fields around the island,
known as chinampas.19
In addition to building their city, they also began adapting themselves to the
political systems of the valley. When the Mexica had first migrated, and even when they
had settled in Tenochtitlan, they followed a more “primitive” system of rule, that of the
calpulli. While some calpullin (plural of calpulli) were of higher status than others, all
were flexible and could absorb migrants or lose members if people desired to emigrate.
The calpullin also allowed for some social mobility, which was the basis for individual
gains during the imperialistic phase of the Mexica described below. The Tepanecs, now
in control, imposed a new political structure on the Mexica, in effect forcing them to
16

Ibid., 440-2.
Fray Diego Durán, History of the Indies of New Spain, trans. Doris Heyden (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 46.
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Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in the Aztec World (Oxford: University
Press, 2006), 60.
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Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America, 446.
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mimic the valley’s political structure. Foremost they imposed a tlatoani, essentially a
king.20
With the creation of a tlatoani comes the creation of nobility – called the pipiltin.
The pipiltin were an important group of warriors, supposedly, with the all-important
Toltec heritage, and were the pool from which a new tlatoani would be selected.
Together, the tlatoani (king) and the pipiltin (nobility) once independent, ran the Empire
and drove its conquests. Another change to the Mexica’s political tradition that came
from the Tepanecs was the ending of the calpulli’s tradition of communally owned land,
on which small farmers could prosper, but which limited the power of the budding
nobility. During the Mexica’s conquests the nobility would be similar to feudal lords
ruling over the mayeque (essentially non-Mexica serfs) who would owe tribute to the
pipiltin.21 The Mexica were now primed to expand; that is, they had the socio-political
structure that allowed for military expansionism and tributary gain, but first they would
need to stop being vassals themselves.
The rise of the Mexica and of the Triple Alliance can be linked to a war between
the city-states of Azcapotzalco and Texcoco. Texcoco was an Alcohua (an ethnic group
in the Valley) city-state on the eastern shore of lake Texcoco and was the only true rival
to Tepanec power. Ixtlilxochitl, the tlatoani of Texcoco, waged war against
Azcapotzalco. The Mexica were in an awkward position as their current tlatoani,
Chimpalpopoca, was the grandson of the tlatoani of Azcapotzalco, and Ixtlilxochitl was
married to Chimpalpopoca’s half-sister. Still, Chimpalpopoca was faithful to his
grandfather and fought against Texcoco, and with the help of the Mexica, the Tepanecs
20
21

Conrad and Demarest, Religion and Empire, 23-5.
Ibid., 15-6.
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were victorious against the killed Ixtlilxochitl. The Mexica were rewarded for their help,
and Texcoco became their tributary.22 Even though Texcoco was at the time a de jure
tributary, Texcoco was treated as, and would ultimately become, an ally to the Mexica.
The Tepanecs, worried about the Mexica’s increasing strength, sought to curtail
Mexica political and military power. Relations between the Tepanecs and the Mexica
soured when the Tepanecs, in 1426, began an embargo against the Mexica to curtail their
economic growth.23 In addition to the embargo, which was strangling the supply of
materials they needed to maintain life on the swampy island, the Tepanecs raised the
amount of tribute required from the Mexica. Tensions rose rapidly in 1427 with the death
of Tezozomoc, the tlatoani of Azcapotzalco, and the assassination of Chimpalpopoca, the
tlatoani of the Mexica. The Mexica, likely, assassinated Chimpalpopoca themselves
because he was an ineffective leader, and by assassinating him the Mexica cut their
consanguineous tie to the Tepanecs and could then act to counter the embargo. These
incidents led to the ascension of leaders on both sides who were determined to bring
about war. Itzcoatl became the new Mexica tlatoani because he was an excellent warrior
capable of facing the Tepanecs, and he was likely behind the assassination plot. After the
death of Tezozomoc, ruler of Azcapotzalco, Maxtla, a nobleman with strong anti-Mexica
sentiments, usurped his brother, who the Mexica had supported for ascension.24 See fig.1.
This was not just a rebellion for the Mexica; it was their chance at greatness. No
one knew this more than the Machiavellian Mexica nobleman Tlacaelel. Tlacaelel was
the nephew of Itzcoatl, who was praised by Durán as “the greatest warrior, the bravest
22
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and mightiest, that the Aztec nation has ever had – the most cunning man ever produced
by Mexico.”25 Working with Itzcoatl, Tlacaelel’s first step was to incentivize the
noblemen to back a war against Azcapotzalco, and to do this he needed to make the
commoners of Tenochtitlan into serfs in order to reward their compliance. According to
Durán this was achieved by making a deal made with the commoners: if the Mexica won,
the peasants would serve the nobles, but if they lost, the peasants could literally eat the
nobles “in cracked and dirty dishes,” so that their “flesh” would be “totally degraded,”
which was meant to disgrace their bodies.26 It is doubtful that any commoner would have
agreed to this lose-lose agreement, and is likely a fictional part of Mexica history to
justify the nobility’s dominance. If the Mexica had won, the peasants would have owed
the nobility tribute, and if Tepanecs had won, the peasants would have owed
Azcapotzalco tribute. However, the concocted wager served its purpose of inducing the
nobility to fight, reinforcing their importance as well as legitimating their high status.27
In order to dislodge the Tepanecs of Azcapotzalco from power, the Mexica
needed to both make alliances and exploit Tepanec weaknesses. In 1428 this culminated
in an agreement that would initiate the Triple Alliance, so named because of the three
city-states that formed it: Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan. The Mexica began by
recruiting their newly conquered tributary, Texcoco. This was an easy alliance because
of the long-standing rivalry between Texcoco and Azcapotzalco. The Mexica next
exploited the internal divisions among the Tepanecs; they successfully had the Tepanec
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city of Tlacopan ally with them and the Alcohua of Texcoco. As mentioned, these three
city-states would form the Triple Alliance.2829
In that same year the Mexica, the Alcohua, the unfaithful Tepanecs of Tlacopan,
with the help of two groups from outside the Valley of Mexico, the Tlaxcalans, and the
Huexotzinca formed a transitory alliance and attacked Azcapotzalco. After 112 days
Azcapotzalco fell, and the Tlaxcalans and Huexotzinca returned to their individual citystates.3031 Afterward the Mexica, Alcohua, and the unfaithful Tepanecs formed a
triumvirate alliance; it was meant to aid one another in military defense and campaigns.
The spoils of future of conquests and tribute would be divided between the city-states of
Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan as two-fifths, two-fifths, and one-fifth
respectively.32 The lesser distribution to Tlacopan represents their minor status in the
Alliance both militarily and politically.
Along with gaining independence the Mexica gained the farmland of
Azcapotzalco and used this to reward those nobles and warriors who fought courageously
for independence. According to Durán, Tlacaelel advised Itzcoatl to distribute the lands
amongst those “who had distinguished themselves in war.”33 This was no egalitarian act
considering it was only nobles who were granted these lands. Even so, this act shows the
break from traditional calpullin centered societal structure to that of more distinct social
strata. The wager with the commoners in essence was “fulfilled,” and they were
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increasingly marginalized.34
After their victory, Itzcoatl and his advisors took the opportunity to continue to
diminish the influence, of the calpulli – the commoner class that constituted the cities
population. The first step in shifting power was to formalize how the position of tlatoani,
the equivalent of a king, was transferred. The calpullin were no longer the decision
makers in the selection of the new tlatoani, rather it was a newly founded oligarchy
called “‘Council of Four,’” which consisted of the previous tlatoani’s personal council.
The Machiavellian-like Tlacaelel went further and reorganized religious and civil offices.
Unfortunately, the histories are vague about what exactly occurred. Montezuma
Ilhuicamina, who would later become tlatoani and from now on referred to as
Montezuma I, rigidified social classes’ dress and privileges and created separate schools
for the nobility and commoners. Conrad and Demarest assert that these changes, which
occurred over the forty-two year period of Itzcoatl and Montezuma I’s rules, had only put
them on the same level as the Tepanecs.35
Beyond inheriting Azcapotzalco’s territories, the Mexica also inherited its
problems. The most pressing problem was the lack of a cultural authority from not
having Toltec heritage. When Tezozomoc (the tlatoani of Azcapotzalco) died, the
Tepanec state, which he created and ruled, weakened under his successor, Maxtla. This
weakness contributed to the decision of the Tepanecs of Tlacopan to side with the
Mexica. The largest obstacle to Tepanec authority was the absence of Toltec heritage to
legitimize their rule within the Valley. Toltec ancestry was important because Toltecs
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were considered to be descendants of the god Quetzalcoatl.36 Royal sanguinity trumped
ability to rule, at least for the transfer of power from Tezozomoc to Maxtla. Itzcoatl,
Tlacaelel, and Montezuma I knew this, and in an Orwellian maneuver had all of the
Mexica’s pictographic histories burned and rewritten, or drawn rather. Their new
histories down played the Mexica’s “barbarous” ancestry and linked them instead to
Toltec ancestry. A large part of the new and “official” history revised the course the
Mexica took from Aztlan to Tenochtitlan. By having the Mexica “visit” many city-states
that had Toltec heritage, they could link themselves to and claim they were of the Toltec
lineage. The Mexica also claimed that Colhua, a city-state that was a bastion of Toltec
ancestry, granted them a princess in arranged marriage, which gave them a link to the allimportant Toltec heritage.37
After their revolution, the Mexica needed a figure to become a central god that
was unique to their own people, and Itzcoatl, Tlacaelel, and Montezuma I found what
they were looking for in Huitzilopochtli. He was a figure unique to the Mexica and could
be manipulated into a powerful motivational figure through his need for human sacrifice.
See fig. 2. His viciousness in the new histories served this purpose by linking
Huitzilopochtli’s violent tendencies and both his literal and metaphorical thirst for blood
through human sacrifice. The selection of Huitzilopochtli demonstrated that the Mexica
had, and would continue to have, no choice but to follow the rituals Huitzilopochtli
demanded of them. Those rituals included supplying Huitzilopochtli, the sun god, with
the human blood he needed to sustain himself after his daily battles fighting to cross the
sky, specifically by the sacrifice of captured warriors. This made war an integral part of
36
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Mexica’s culture and ritual sacrifice a powerful incentive for the Mexica to go to and
perform well in battle.38
The origins of Huitzilopochtli are complex. He was an amalgam of the more
common, older gods of Mesoamerica Tonatiuh and Tezcatlipoca. Tonatiuh had been the
god of the sun for the Toltec people circa 950 CE. According to legend, he was created
when a lesser warrior god willingly immolated himself in order to become the sun. He
was originally a humble, sickly figure before casting himself into a pyre wearing only
paper armor. However, after he became the sun, he became greedy and would only move
around the earth if the other gods sacrificed their hearts for him. And so, the other gods
agreed and did so, and people had to continue this process by sacrificing human hearts to
Tonatiuh.39 In a poem Huitzilopochtli is described as “he who is dressed in paper, he
who inhabits the region of heat.” This is a clear reference to Tonatiuh who originally
wore paper armor and became the sun.40
Also like Tonatiuh, Huitzilopochtli was originally a hero-like figure who was
minor, but unique, to the Mexica. The important new part of Huitzilopochtli was his need
for daily human sacrifices. Sahagún recounts veneration to Huitzilopochtli: the priest
“had taken his heart from him [a captive], he [the priest] raised it in dedication to the
sun.”41 Sahagún also included a song that venerated Huitzilopochtli calling him the
“leader in war” and Mexica warriors wore a dress in a “yellow feathered cape, which
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through me is the sunshine.”42 Through the imagery of the sun, Huitzilopochtli is
equated to Tonatiuh, the earlier warrior sun god. Karl Taube, an anthropologist, believes
that aspects of Huitzilopochtli were not only drawn from Tonatiuh, but also done so to
replace him as a central figure Huitzilopochtli being the actual sun god validated the
Mexica’s ascension to power as a necessity the because it was their god who was the sun.
And through their conquests and sacrifices they kept the sun moving through the sky.43
The second god to be incorporated into Huitzilopochtli was Tezcatlipoca, whose
name translates to the “Lord of the Smoking Mirror.” He was a major deity to many
Mesoamericans. The smoking mirror refers specifically to mirrors ground from obsidian;
“smoking” refers to the way the black volcanic glass obfuscates reflections. Obsidian
mirrors were believed to have divination-like powers, and Tezcatlipoca could gaze back
through the mirror.44 Mirrors were not always made from obsidian but also pyrite,
known colloquially today as fool’s gold.45 The Nahuatl term for pyrite is tezcatl, which
literally translates to “mirror stone.”46 Tezcatl is also Nahuatl for mirror itself.47 Thus,
tezcatl is a linguistic link to the Lord of the Smoking Mirror and his namesake mineral.
Tezcatlipoca, beyond being metaphysically connected to the mirror stone also had one
physically attached to his foot.48
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Tezcatlipoca’s place in the pantheon is by no means clear. He was the child of
Ometeotl, the little mentioned hermaphrodite who birthed the four gods that created the
various worlds. Ometeotl had four Tezcatlipoca sons: Red, White, Black, and Blue
Tezcatlipoca. Each colored Tezcatlipoca was a different god and each was assigned to a
cardinal direction: Xipe Totec (Red, east), Quetzalcoatl (White, west), Tezcatlipoca
(Black, north), and Huitzilopochtli (Blue, south). Huitzilopochtli’s position is unique to
the Mexica as he was exclusively their god.4950
The Black Tezcatlipoca is the figure that has been and will be discussed; he was a
benevolent god. At times he would give “riches to men,” but at other times he was
malevolent and would bring “men misery, [and] affliction.” 51 Young warriors who tried
to imitate him also admired him, and they practiced in a cult whose followers were
known as telpochtli.52 Like Huitzilopochtli, Tezcatlipoca had been an important deity to
the Toltecs, and he was transmogrified into a central figure for the Toltecs. The Toltecs
attributed some of the powers of rain god Tlaloc to Tezcatlipoca. This melding of
Tezcatlipoca and Tlaloc occurred simultaneously as their religion and politics merged,
similarly to the Mexica’s sacrificial oblations with Huitzilopochtli.53 This tradition of
veneration for Tezcatlipoca carried into the Mexica culture; they referred to Tezcatlipoca
as “‘he whose slaves we are.’”54
In the same song about how warriors sang to venerate Huitzilopochtli, there is a
line that reads, “you have but one foot”; this might be a allusion to Tezcatlipoca, who as
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mentioned had only one real foot while the other was an obsidian mirror.55 In 1486, after
Ahuitzotl, a Mexica tlatoani, returned from a successful military campaign, the Mexica
held a ceremonial coronation for him. During this ceremony the Mexica placed a mirror
stone on the head of a Huitzilopochtli. This is significant because when a new tlatoani
was crowned, he needed to thank and ask Tezcatlipoca for guidance.56 Part of this
process of thanks involved the new tlatoani repeating a speech in which he refers to a
“two-faced mirror wherein we commoners lie.”57 Placing the mirror on Huitzilopochtli’s
head seems to connect the awesome powers of Tezcatlipoca to Huitzilopochtli. This
symbolism might allude to the fact that Huitzilopochtli is also referred to as the Blue
Tezcatlipoca in some creation myths. Or it might reference the guidance this warrior sun
god figure had over the Mexica.
In the Mexica’s mythical journey from Aztlan, Huitzilopochtli is their guide, and
he often mimics Tezcatlipoca’s capriciousness. He bestows fortune on them by bringing
them to their new preordained home of Tenochtitlan; however, he also brings upon them
misfortune by having them purposefully offend the Colhua in order to be cast out from
their lands. At the end of their journey Huitzilopochtli guided the Mexica to the island
where they were to found their city. They Mexica they were home when they saw an
eagle clutching a rattlesnake on a cactus on a stone. Supposedly, the island itself had
grown from a heart that a Mexica priest had excised and threw into the lake as
Huitzilopochtli ordered him to. 58 The balance between the good and bad acts of
Huitzilopochtli mimics the ways in which Tezcatlipoca could bestow fortunes or miseries
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on men. This similarity goes further, and at the end of Sahagún’s account of the birth of
Huitzilopochtli, he records that the Mexica “placed their trust in Uitzilopochtli” (an
alternate spelling for Huitzilopochtli). This is not unlike the faith the newly crowned
tlatoani Ahuitzotl, placed in Tezcatlipoca, and both these figures were guides to the
Mexica.
For these changes to become official canon, the Mexica’s society needed to
undergo drastic changes. Itzcoatl’s first order of business was to burn their old histories
and rewrite them in a more favorable light, which justified the extreme stratification of
classes and the nobility’s right to rule.59 Tlacaelel and Montezuma I created schools for
the commoners called telpochcalli, which taught boys how to be warriors and girls to be
housekeepers. But more importantly, the schools taught children the basics of their
history and religion.60 There was a separate school for the nobility and young priests
called a calmeca; here students would also be indoctrinated and taught religious practices
and “official” Mexica history. Part of this schooling involved teaching the pupils how to
identify “good” teachers and priests, that is, people who knew the sanctioned histories
and religious beliefs. Another tool to shape public understanding were artworks
commissioned to represent the newly transformed gods and customs. However, this
artwork never seemed to make it far out of the Valley of Mexico, which stresses how
confined these views were.61 The new schools – along with new pictographic histories,
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new religious practices, and new artwork – replaced original oral histories and quickly
imbedded itself into Mexica society.62
The Mexica had come to be told that their success, militaristically, was in essence
the divine fortune of their god and their god alone. In return for Huitzilopochtli’s guiding
the Mexica to their homeland and aiding their military endeavors, they owed him
sustenance. This came in the form of human sacrifice, specifically hearts from warriors.
For the Mexica, the fate of the entire world was in their hands; if they did not provide
Huitzilopochtli with hearts he could not complete his daily battle through the sky. In
effect, there would be no sunrise the next day. This was an intense motivation for their
conquests, and the drastic changes that the Mexica psyche experienced from this
transformation in religious ideology is difficult to understate. No matter how violent the
acts were, in the Mexica mind, these acts were literally saving the world and their
civilization.
Beyond the religious pressure to capture soldiers in war, there also was a
socioeconomic incentive for warfare. Success was measured in captives taken and brave
deeds performed in battle. From success in war, nobles were allotted lands and
administrative positions, which dealt mostly with tribute. But this also could be said of
the commoners who were rewarded with certain privileges of dress and status within their
class. This was an important tool because everyone had a stake in conquest, both earthly
and heavenly. Demarest and Conrad encapsulated this view the best, “if successful, the
freeman warrior would gain privilege in this life, and if he perished in the divine quest he
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would gain immortality in the next, as a warrior-companion to the sun.”63 Warfare was
so important to the Mexica that even dying was in battle was sacred. Success in warfare
meant bringing in captives to sacrifice to Huitzilopochtli, and if you were successful
enough you could gain heritable status, which marked your children apart from the rest of
society.
The Mexica had successfully created a society that tied religious imperialism to
personal incentives. This was incredibly successful as the Mexica began to expand.
Itzcoatl next sought to takeover the rest of the Valley of Mexico, and around 1430 CE the
Triple Alliance did just that by conquering the southern lakes covered in rich and highly
productive chinampas, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
However, Chalco, the city-state on the western portion of Lake Chalco, remained
stubbornly independent until the mid 1440’s. See map 4. Next, in the late 1430’s, they
expanded southward out of the Valley and took control of important semi-tropical
agricultural lands of what is today part of the Federal District of Morelos. In 1440
Montezuma I assumed control after Itzcoatl had died. In 1458, the Triple Alliance
continued their conquests; they took control of the rest of Morelos, parts of modern day
Oaxaca, and moved eastward – gaining access to the Gulf Coast.64
Montezuma I died in 1468, and his successor was his grandson Axayacatl.
Axayacatl made some westward expansions, reaching the border of the Tarascan Empire,
but the Tarascans halted this expansion by crushing his army. The rest of Axayacatl’s
rein was spent consolidating previous conquests and solving the logistical problems the
bureaucracy faced from collecting and managing tribute. This meant creating new
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bureaucratic roles and reconquering rebellious areas. Axayacatl finally cemented control
of Tenochtitlan’s sister city, Tlatelolco, by officially conquering it. Strangely, the
Mexica had allowed the city-state, founded simultaneously by a separate group of Mexica
on the same island, to remain independent. They likely were left independent because of
ethnic ties and because the Mexica of Tenochtitlan did not want to disrupt Tlatelolco’s
economics. Tlatelolco had become a major trading hub even before Tenochtitlan
became powerful, but at the time of its conquest it was the largest center of trade in
Mesoamerica. Axayacatl replaced Tlatelolco’s tlatoani with a military governor giving
the Mexica control over their merchant class. Axayacatl’s consolidations were attempts
to strengthen political control, prevent unrest in amongst the tributaries, and with the
addition of Tlatelolco increase control over trade.65
Axayacatl died in 1481 and Tizoc, an ineffective leader, replaced him and was
assassinated five years later leading to the ascension of Ahuitzotl in 1486. By this point,
the Triple Alliance had shifted from being relatively equal partners to favoring the
Mexica, but under Ahuitzotl the Mexica were the de facto leaders of the Triple Alliance.
Ahuitzotl began his career by reconquering troubled areas. He continued campaigns
taking over the rest of Oaxaca and advancing westward, pressing against the Tarascan
Empire, to the Pacific Ocean. Ahuitzotl was focused on securing the important trade
routes through these areas and fortifying the western border with the Tarascans to secure
his control.
Ahuitzotl’s conquests underscored an important shift in Mexica expansion. Early
on the Alliance focused on conquering areas that were important for food production.
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Now however, conquests began to focus on regions important for their trade routes and
luxury goods. These changes were making the Empire incredibly wealthy. The shift in
strategy reflects one of trying to gain power but also support its growing population. By
Ahuitzotl’s reign the Empire was more focused on generating wealth and prestige.66 This
stemmed from a growing demand for status and religious items as all the classes of
Tenochtitlan grew in size and wealth. The growing demand for luxury items can be seen
in the increase of full time artisans, the dwindling number of part time craft producers,
and the centralization of specialists in key cities, specifically Tenochtitlan. With a few
exceptions, which will be discussed later, the areas in and around the Valley of Mexico
shifted from part time craft production exclusively to agriculture in order to support the
burgeoning population as well as increased demand for high quality goods.67
With Ahuitzotl’s death in 1502, Montezuma Xocoyotzin, known here on as
Montezuma II, became the Mexica’s new tlatoani. Montezuma II had many problems to
address. One problem was weakening the Tlaxcalan kingdom, a plucky Nahuatl group to
the east of the Valley of Mexico. Another problem was suppressing uprisings within the
Triple Alliance. Montezuma II did manage to subjugate a few new territories to the
south. Montezuma II, like his predecessors, struggled to maintain control over
subjugated city-states and regions because the Triple Alliance never really had full
control over them in the first place.68 Originally, this process of reconquest was a normal
and agreeable part of the Empire; rulers proved themselves in war and nobles and
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commoners used it to gain privileges which in turn fed the priests sacrificial needs.
However, by the time of Montezuma II the Empire became too large to maintain the
constant warfare that expanded it so quickly. Montezuma curtailed the reward system by
restricting upward mobility within all the Mexica classes. The nobility was rigidified and
focused on lineage rather than ability in war. This was meant to curtail the Mexica’s
internal motivations for warfare.69 Paradoxically, Montezuma II needed to be perceived
as an effective general in control of a powerful army as perceived power was just as
important in maintaining and conquering new tributaries.
Warfare in Mesoamerica came in two forms, combative and flowery, and through
both system soldiers were rewarded for their captives. A combative war is in a sense a
traditional form of warfare meant to conquer an enemy town or city-state. Opposing
armies, which consisted of small units of a mix of veteran and novice warriors, would
face each other and begin battle by firing long distance projectiles. After these munitions
began to dwindle the arms infantry would advance using atlatls, spear throwers, until
they came close enough to switch to hand-to-hand weapons. Units were kept about a
two-meter distance from one another so that opposing warriors could pair off and fight
one another. The purpose in these fights was not to kill but to maim an opponent until
they were disabled enough to be taken off the battlefield and used as sacrificial victims.
However, this is not to say that there were no outright fatalities from wars of conquest. 70
Flowery war, despite its deceptive name, was not a matter taken lightly. It was
conducted in a much more regulated fashion than wars of conquest. An equal number of
equally skilled warriors would square off in a flowery war. A flowery war was meant to
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display the military prowess of a power’s soldiers. Therefore, combatants would only
use hand-to-hand combat weapons such as the maquahuitl, a sword like weapon, and the
tepoztopilli, a lance-like weapon. These weapons will be discussed in greater length in
the obsidian chapter. These weapons required diligent training, which both commoners
and nobility received in their respective schools although the nobility was better trained.
Therefore, winning in a flowery war was achieved when one side took more captives by
carefully disabling them in combat. While this seems similar to regular combat, there
were much less outright fatalities, and a flowery war was a protracted conflict that could
go on, potentially, indefinitely. At its best a flowery war was meant to demonstrate that
to an enemy the futility of fighting in a combative war, and at least it served to syphon off
strong enemy’s best warriors.71
Ross Hassig views flowery warfare as a development to overcome the logistics of
warfare as the Empire expanded. The Triple Alliance’s large empire with its constant
upheavals did not have enough soldiers or the logistical capability of supplying entire
armies for a season worth of campaigns in various places. Therefore, they developed the
flowery war to be used amongst its neighboring enemies such as Tlaxcalans to display
power and eliminate strong warriors. In combination with flowery warfare the Empire
sought to strangle trade routes and chip away at enemy territories in a process known as
circling. Because the Empire had enmeshed itself so strongly into trade, once a territory
was encircled it would see extra-territorial trading cease. This was the case with the
Tlaxcalans.72
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Conquered peoples did not suddenly live under Triple Alliance law; rather, they
were expected to pay yearly tributes often based on whatever goods were plentiful within
the region. This process facilitated conflict because the loose control and high tribute
demands led to rebellion, which once reconquered were raised higher. The conquered
areas owed the Triple Alliance a mix of goods ranging from foodstuffs to extreme
luxuries such as live eagles. See fig. 3. Some tribute items were unobtainable in a local
region and could only be acquired through trade. This became a standard practice as the
Empire had grown in order to enrich its own merchants because it was through their
merchants that some tributaries would gain the items needed. Tribute originally was
brought to Tenochtitlan where it was divided amongst the three city-states of the Triple
Alliance with, as mentioned, two-fifths going to Tenochtitlan and Texcoco and a fifth
going to Tlacopan. Whether or not this was the way goods were actually shared, seems
dubious because of the immense power the Mexica held.73
Montezuma II radically altered the manner in which tribute was collected.
Traditionally, tribute flowed from conquered areas to closest city-state that was
conquered and then to Tenochtitlan. Montezuma II reorganized the tribute system by
creating a bureaucracy. Tributaries were now organized into thirty-eight provinces that
were focused around tributary capitals. Tribute from areas still pooled to local towns but
now those local towns sent what they owed to the tributary capitals. From the tributary
capital the tribute was sent to Tenochtitlan; each level had nobles who were only
concerned about that levels tribute and sending along the chain. This process became
even more efficient as tribute was delivered based on standard times, quarterly or every
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eighty days; perishables were the exception and brought when ready. Montezuma II
made these changes for several reasons: to make it easier to keep track of the flow of
goods; to impress the local leaders that would arrive at times that would awe them; and to
gauge the fealty of the provinces by whether or not the tribute was timely or even if it
arrived.74
Tribute was more complex than simply bringing the goods to the island city.
Some regions could not naturally produce certain valuable goods, and they needed to
trade in order to obtain them. This process of trading went through channels controlled
by the Mexica regime. This allowed Mexica traders to travel all edges of the empire to
use its trading ties, establish new ones, and even spy for the government. Spying was an
important function, since traders were the only group allowed into enemy or foreign
states. The traders belonged to guilds that had their own stratification and could advance
within them. The Mexica Regime subsidized their profession, and technically the Mexica
government controlled the goods being traded.75 However, the merchants were rewarded
like the other classes and could gain special privileges and status. 76 Professional traders
dealt almost exclusively with luxury items. These consisted of goods ranging from furs
and cloth to obsidian and copper items.77
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Chapter Two
Indian Corn
“It has dried husks, maize silk, tassels at the top” – Florentine Codex78
Central American ecology played a major role in shaping Mesoamerican society;
consequently, understanding Central American ecology is essential to appreciate the very
different developmental path Mesoamerica took when compared to Eurasia. The ecology
of the New World would had far reaching consequences in agriculture, technology, and
socio-political formations. This chapter will explore what the ecological differences were
and how they led to the style of agriculture that spread across all of Mesoamerica. Jared
Diamond is correct to trace civilizations to their roots to understand why events, such as
the Conquest of Mexico, played out the ways in which they did. He is also correct the
Americas lacked some of the potentials in flora and fauna, but Mesoamericans made up
for these “deficiencies” and created elaborate systems of agriculture. The ecology and
style of agriculture had a strong influence on the ways in which Mesoamerican culture
and technology developed. I will begin to explore these differences in this chapter as
well as the following two chapters.
Arguably, the largest difference between the Americas and Eurasia was the
Americas lack of large animals capable of being domesticated. Many animals capable of
being domesticated became extinct around the end of the most recent ice age. The reason
for this is hotly debated. Some scholars believe it was climate change, while others
believe Paleo-Indians overhunted large game animals driving them to extinction.
However, it is more likely a combination of the two theories: rapid climate change altered
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habitats, which when compounded with occasional hunting was enough to push large
mammal species with slow reproductive rates over the edge and into extinction.79 These
extinctions left the Americas with fewer animals that could be domesticated. Not all
animals can be domesticated. Some species have problems with breeding in captivity, and
others have too wild a disposition to ever be tamed. Therefore, with many large
mammals becoming extinct, Amerindians had fewer choices for domestication.80
The lack of large domesticable mammals led to noticeable differences in the diet
and agricultural techniques of Mesoamerica and Eurasia. Without large mammals, there
was no dairy and little meat in the Mesoamerican diet. Some historians have seized upon
this difference and see it as the reason for the practice of cannibalism. In fact, however, it
led to the development of a diet that focused on plants with high fat and protein content.
Mesoamericans domesticated a wide variety of crops to fill nutritional needs.
Mesoamericans relied on a combination of maize, beans, squash, and a variety of other
crops. Of course, old world agriculture also had pulses and other plants, such as wheat,
barely, and flax that filled fat and protein needs.81
Mesoamericans also used a technique of intercropping known as the milpa
system, which not only was highly productive but also important in maintaining soil
fertility. However, one must first understand how the more “conventional” agricultural
practices of Eurasia developed and worked in order to understand the differences between
new world and old world agriculture. Southwestern Eurasia, the Fertile Crescent, is
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arguably the area of the oldest developed form of agriculture, and the first step towards
agriculture is the domestication of the crops.
According to Jared Diamond, the Fertile Crescent had several distinct advantages
that facilitated crop domestication. Geographically the Fertile Crescent was part of the
largest area in the world with a Mediterranean climate, a climate with mild wet winters
and long dry summers. This climate favored annual grasses that would sprout rapidly
and be able to grow in drier conditions. They would not grow long, and tended to have
large seeds to be dispersed for the following growing season. Diamond includes a study
of the world’s wild grasses, of the fifty-six best, grasses with seeds at least ten times as
large as the median grasses, thirty-six are native only to Eurasia’s Mediterranean zone. In
addition many of these plants were self-pollinating, but could occasionally crosspollinate. This meant that useful hybrids were more likely to develop and retain their
traits, because they could not easily cross-pollinate again. This ability would facilitate
domestication by making new and better hybrids that could be easily sown. Diamond
also postulates that because of a decline of gazelles and a lack of aquatic resources, protofarmers were pushed to focus on the use of grasses as a new staple in their diets.82 The
cultivation of Maize in Mesoamerica is far different than the crops of the Fertile
Crescent.
Maize is much more difficult to cultivate than the eight “founder crops” Diamond
mentions for the Fertile Crescent. The history of maize is still controversial; the most
reliable date for domestication is around 4,000 BCE, but maize is potentially much older.
Maize’s closest wild relative is teosinte, which may not even be its actual ancestor and
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looks nothing like a stalk of maize. Teosinte is a shrubby grass with many thin stems and
small “ears” and no cob. The seeds of teosinte, numbering seven to twelve, have a hard
inedible shell, and all of a seeds on an ear of teosinte combined still have less nutritional
value than a single kernel of modern maize. Farmers tended to breed out a feature of
wild plants that led to the dispersal of seeds in cereal crops, and thereby keeping the
seeds from falling off and making harvesting easier. Teosinte has at least sixteen genes
that control how seedpods shatter and disperse in nature. By comparison wild cereals in
the Fertile Crescent have only one gene controlling the shattering effect.83
Maize is also not self-pollinating, but instead is pollinated by the wind so that one
maize variety can pollinate another, introducing new and different plants in the same
area. This forced a Mesoamerican farmer to comb through and choose the desirable
varieties, a difficult task since modern Mesoamerica might have as many as 5,000
cultivars. A cultivar is one variety of a crop bred for certain attributes and can be thought
of as a breed. Maize is unique in being a domesticated species that has more genetic
diversity than its wild ancestor, which might be explained by multiple domestications or
the interbreeding with multiple wild species.84
Maize was not enough to fill all the nutritional needs, which led Mesoamericans
to develop a different style of farming all together. Another noticeable difference was
that Mesoamericans did not grow their fields in straight furrows. Rather, Mesoamericans
developed a unique style of intercrop farming known as the milpa, a Nahuatl term that
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meant cornfield but has come to mean more.85 To understand the milpa it must again be
examined in comparison to farming in the Fertile Crescent.
Along with its amber waves of wild grains, Southwestern Eurasia was also gifted
with numerous species of large mammals that could be domesticated. Eurasians
domesticated thirteen of their seventy-two large mammals, compared to one out of
twenty-four in the Americas, the llama. By 6,000 BCE cows had been domesticated in
Southwestern Eurasia.86 Oxen pulled plows developed in Southwestern Eurasia around
4000 BCE.87 The technology was perhaps inspired by an ingenious farmer watching
oxen drag rudimentary carts and replaced the cart with a digging stick to drag instead. A
person dragging a digging stick was a common practice to score the earth. So using
knowledge of ox drawn carts, early farmers lashed the digging stick to the horns of an ox
or by attaching a bar across the head of an ox. The ox then walked forward, cutting into
the earth.88 As the ox dragged the rudimentary plow, the farmer scattered seeds of
cereals across the just upturned ground.89 This practice of scattering seeds after an ox
drawn plow is part of the explanation of why straight furrows were a common feature of
Eurasian plow agriculture.
Mesoamericans had ample time to watch the natural world around them when
they began developing maize, and their forms of agriculture demonstrates this by
mimicking natural cycles. The milpa system which grew mainly maize used an
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innovative technique that not only mimicked natural cycles but also enhanced yields
while being ecologically sustainable on the scale that it was practiced. While many crops
can be grown in a milpa, the three most important are maize, beans, and varieties of
squash. Other crops include tomatoes, chilies, peppers, amaranth, chia, avocadoes, and a
variety of other vegetables. 90
Maize, beans, and squash were the three to spread far across the Americas and
have become known colloquially as the “three sisters,” and they grow particularly well
with each other. Maize grows a thick tall stalk and requires many nutrients from the soil
and thereby depletes it. Beans grow tendrils that run up the maize stalk so as to get
adequate sunlight; the roots of the bean nitrify and rejuvenate the soil. The squashes’
lush leaves spread out and protect the base of the other two plants and deter weeds. This
interplay may have natural origins; beans and squash often grow in the same areas as
teosinte, and wild beans have been noted to climb teosinte as domesticated beans climb
maize. 91 At its highest output a milpa was believed to have produced somewhere around
3,000 kg/ha; it is estimated that a return of this value could feed approximately fifteen
and a half people beyond the farmer.9293
The ways that maize, beans, and squash were grown on farms in Mesoamerica
might be due to the long time it took to domesticate the maize. Perhaps through the
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difficultly of finding the right variety of teosinte the farmer found how to grow crops that
worked in a symbiotic manner. The milpa system also owed much of it success, and
possibly its existence, to the lack of any animals that would make plowing viable. The
relatively limited agricultural tools, mainly the digging stick and simple hoes, made the
milpa style practical because using a digging stick meant manually digging the hole for
each seed. The milpa demanded more attention and planning because crops were often
intercropped in small mounds. This is far different from farming in the old world where
the farmer simply scattered the wheat grain as the oxen plowed the land.94
Metallurgy’s incorporation into Mesoamerican agriculture was far different than
they way it was used in the Fertile Crescent. Mesoamerican agricultural tools included
digging sticks, which tips were mostly fire hardened but occasionally had metal tips, and
hoes, which also sometimes had metal blades as well.95 Eurasia invented the plow and
because of plowing they scattered the seeds. Farming in Mesoamerica, however, did not
significantly advance with its tool assortment for agriculture. And while this is partly
because of the lack of a plow, it is also because the crops and style of agriculture were
adapted to fit the tools at hand. Seeds were purposefully planted individually and
intercropped which did not need the plow.96 However, metals were not designed
principally for tools as they often were in the old world. Copper and bronze advancement
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focused more on status items rather than tools such as axes and hoes, which will be
discussed in greater detail in the chapter on metallurgy.97
Households in Mexica Valley had calmilli (the plural form), or gardens, but they
were a more substantial source of food than what is now known as a garden. Susan
Evans, an anthropologist who studied farming practices of the valley, notes that in the
north a calmil (the singular form) was around half a hectare and would supply many
vegetables for the household. Milpas, she claims, tended to have more maize while
calmilli were more diverse and had a heavier emphasis on vegetables such as tomatoes,
peppers, herbs along with some traditional milpa standards – maize, beans, and squashes.
The calmil served as a reservoir for seeds for the next year’s milpa and calmil plots along
with much of the farmer’s food. The farmer’s milpa plot was focused more on crops that
were required for tribute or used in trade; the main four crops of tribute were maize,
beans, amaranth, and chia.98
Possibly the most famous form of agriculture used in the Mexica Valley was the
chinampa, known colloquially as a floating garden. Floating garden is a misnomer
because the artificial islands were attached to the lakebed; however, this stemmed from
confusion around the floating reed mats that were used to germinate seeds to allow
chinampas to be in continuous use.99 A chinampa was made by driving stakes into the
lakebed and then weaving them with sticks and reeds to make a border. The woodwork
was filled in with rotting vegetation and sediment from the bottom of the lake. Planting
trees along the border allowed roots to take hold and secure the chinampa. Water from
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the lake would then irrigate the chinampa and create a sort of hydroponic garden, which
was incredibly productive. See fig. 4.1 and 4.2. Historian Aguilar-Moreno claims that the
chinampas of Lake Xochimilco, the southernmost freshwater lake of the valley’s
lacustrine system, were much more extensive than those of Tenochtitlan, which
surrounded the city itself, and supplied about half of the food for Tenochtitlan.100
Terracing was also common throughout the Mesoamerican world and, especially,
on the more vertical landscapes. These terraces were not as well planned and precise as
those of the Incas, nor were they always made of stone. Some of the terraces’ walls were
made of rough stone, compact earth, or cacti and agave. The maguey terraces not only
prevent erosion but also retained soil moisture, which was very important for the higher
and drier altitudes. The average amount of maguey planted on a farm could provide
farmers with three liters a day of aguamiel, a potable sap-like product. This was
extremely important and should not be underestimated since farms did not have a
constant supply of water. The aguamiel could also be fermented into pulque, an
alcoholic beverage, which was very important to Mesoamericans and was traded widely.
The leaves of the maguey plant were also used to produce fiber used as cordage, clothes,
and even for roofing.101
Within Mesoamerica, all fields were well taken care of, and the Amerindians of
Mexico had many husbandry techniques. Fields were either ridged furrows to deter
erosion or had a series of small mounds in which crops were planted.102 Beyond using
the milpa style of intercropping to maintain fertility, farmers also used various sources of
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biodegradables to fertilize fields. Once a stalk of maize reached maturity and was picked,
the stalk had little purpose, and a farmer would sow the stalk and other vegetable waste
back into the soil. Human waste was also collected and used for fertilizer among other
things.103 Additionally, pond scum accumulation between chinampas had the added
benefit of being an extra source of fertilizer.104
Beyond the fertilizing, sustainability, and hyper-productivity associated with
hydroponic chinampas, ordinary fields were irrigated or drained to increase yields or to
make agriculture possible. Levees were crucial in maintaining proper irrigation and
drainage; the tops of which were even farmed. Farmers would even cultivate wetlands
through elaborate drainage systems making the land suitable for agriculture. The
mountain range known as the Sierra Madre had steep slopes that hampered agriculture,
but intrepid farmers terraced the slopes and were to have two annual yields because of
fog moisture at the high altitudes.105 The Mesa Central, which includes the Valley of
Mexico and Tenochtitlan, used essentially one method of irrigation; although, agriculture
often relied on rain as the main source of water. Farmers used a system of dams and
weirs that would collect silt from runoff during floods and then spread the water onto
fields. Similarly, they utilized springs, streams, and collecting pools to do the same.106
As productive as agricultural styles were, they have come under attack by some
scholars, not because of the feasibility of their large-scale production but because of
skepticism about the nutritive value of the crops. Most specifically maize, which lacks
the essential amino acids lysine and tryptophan. Michael Harner famously, or infamously
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for some scholars, theorized that cannibalism in the Mexica culture was a response to an
increased population. For Harner, the lack of domesticated animals would mean no fats
and no animal protein. 107 This ignores the immense population of both Tenochtitlan,
estimated from 200,000 to 250,000 in 1519, and the Valley of Mexico, with a population
estimated at 1.6 million in 1519, which would require more than cannibalism to sustain
themselves.108109
Harner ignored the nutritional value of the Mexica diet. The “three sisters” were
not only ecologically complementary but also nutritionally complementary. Maize
provided much of the nutrition for Amerindian societies but lacked the key amino acids
lysine and tryptophan and the vitamin niacin. Beans were rich in lysine and tryptophan,
but lacked the other essential amino acids cysteine and methionine. Squashes provided
vitamins and minerals that rounded out the farmer’s diet. Therefore, these three crops
provided a nutritionally balanced diet. 110
Additionally maize in many Mesoamerican cultures underwent an additional
processing step that made viable a diet of only maize and beans. Once shucked, the
maize kernels were soaked in a mixture of limewater, calcium hydroxide, and then
boiled. This chemical process freed niacin from the kernels and added calcium to the
diet. The kernels were then washed and shelled to remove the pericarp, and, once dried,
the maize would be ground into flour.111
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The Mexica also harvested tecuitlatl, which can be considered a miracle crop.
Tecuitlatl is the Nahuatl name for a food made from spirulina geitlerii, a type of algae.
Tecuitlatl was collected by fine nets from the lakes in the Valley of Mexico and then
squeezed and pressed into cake shapes. The pressed cakes of algae were dried and sold
in the markets of Tenochtitlan. Bernal Diaz, one of the conquistadores who helped topple
the Mexica, described tecuitlatl as tasting “very much like cheese.”112 Tecuitlatl was
incredibly rich in protein; it was comprised of 70% protein and a complete source of
amino acids. Anthropologist Bernard Ortiz de Montellano calculated that harvesting only
.25% of Lake Texcoco for the algae could feed the population of Tenochtitlan for a year,
which he estimated around 300,000.113
The agriculture grown over a variety of these regions became incredibly
important to the Triple Alliance as the population of the Valley increased. As mentioned
the Empire began its expansion based on its need to secure its food supply. The
chinampas around Xochimilco were major producers of Tenochtitlan’s food supply early;
however, Susan Evans believes that even by the 1450’s the population of the Valley of
Mexico was reaching the limit of its carrying capacity under farming techniques of the
time.114 By the time of Montezuma II this made tribute demands of staples an important
matter.
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In total, the Alliance was owed twenty-eight bins of maize, twenty-one bins of
beans, twenty-one bins of chia, and eighteen bins of amaranth.115 This amount has been
estimated to feed around 360,000 people, which Alan Knight cautions at being somewhat
high.116 Based on my own calculations it could feed at most 100,000 people. According
to Knight this food, once received, was then distributed or sold to the population of
Tenochtitlan.117 Historian Ross Hassig contends that some of these foodstuffs were
meant to be prepared for soldiers on way to battle and that runners would be sent in
advance of an army to have tributaries still loyal to Alliance to assemble needed
supplies.118 In either case tribute in the form of agricultural goods was an important
matter for the Empire, in feeding both its people and its army. These foodstuffs along
with whatever else was required by a province were collected in the tributary’s capital
then carried to Tenochtitlan by porters over the cities’ causeways or up to the lakeshore
where canoes did the rest.119 See maps 5.1 and 5.2.
Agriculture developed radically different in Mesoamerica than in Eurasia. It
domesticated an important number of crops that were nutritionally complete. Rather than
developing a style of agriculture based on technology, Mesoamericans developed
agriculture to mimic natural processes. This allowed for a much more sustainable form
of agriculture. However, the negative aspect of this style was the limited impact it had on
advancing metallurgy. Yet, as the next chapter will discuss, this was not a priority for
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Mesoamericans. Furthermore, agriculture played a large role in determining the original
course of Alliance expansion to sustain population growth, and it affected military
campaigns by supplying soldiers with supplies. Nonetheless, the reliance on food from
outside Tenochtitlan would be one advantage Cortés would use during the conquest.
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Chapter Three
Itztli
“It Takes Its Name From Itself” – Florentine Codex120
To understand the path of technological development that Mesoamerica, and more
specifically the Nahuas, undertook we must examine obsidian’s material uses and cultural
aesthetic. Obsidian was pervasive throughout every part of a Nahua’s life, including
linguistics, household objects, tools, deities, and religious practices. In this section I will
examine all of these uses and their connection to obsidian in order to show that
Mesoamericans emphasized lithic technology because of the cultural importance of
obsidian. Compared to metal, stone was much more important to Mexica and Nahua
societies as a whole. Stone was a link to the gods, through physical items, and the
spiritual and metaphysical powers they represented. It is because of these connections
and obsidian’s physical properties that it was emphasized in tools. Anthropologist
Nicholas J. Saunders encapsulated many of the important reasons for obsidian’s
importance:
Obsidian’s peerless utility in a world without metal tools, together with its
occurrence only at particular geological locations, generated an enduring
Mesoamerican aesthetic, which saw the controllers of obsidian sources
and the makers of obsidian blades connected to cosmic forces. This in
turn endowed subsequent acts of obsidian use with potency and
significance, whether in acts of sacrifice and bloodletting, or in producing
a web of regional exchange networks throughout Mesoamerican
prehistory. From this perspective, obsidian can be considered unique in its
capacity to create social relationships, and stimulate symbolic connections
between materiality and culture across Mesoamerica.121
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While Mesoamericans did have some metallurgy – beginning in Western Mexico around
650 CE, Saunders is accurate in that many of the important civilizations in this region had
developed solely with lithic technology.122 Saunders believed that the aesthetic qualities
of obsidian were the reason for its ubiquitous uses throughout Mesoamerica. It was these
unique qualities that gave it an enduring mystique in the Mesoamerican mind, and which
I will explore throughout this chapter.
Sanders’ statement about the few geological sources of obsidian refers not to its
scarcity, but to the mystique of only being able to obtain the material in a few locations.
In addition, perhaps further supporting his geographic and aesthetic theory is the
specificity of some types of obsidian. For example, obsidian from Pachuca has a unique
green hue that allows archeologists to easily identify the source of obsidian tools.
Similarly, even if some obsidian stones look alike, each obsidian source has a unique
chemical composition, which leads to minor differences in appearance and might explain
another part of the aesthetic of obsidian.123 Pachuca obsidian was widely traded. It was
used in prismatic blades, sacrificial tools connecting users to their religion and gods, and
lapidaries made it into religious and status objects, which, too, were widely traded. It is
the cultural attributions of status and religious connections to this material that shaped the
development of technology in Mesoamerica. In fact obsidian, along with other lithic
materials, were so essential to ways of life that controlling their sources shaped the
expansion and policy of the Alliance.
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Before exploring the worldly uses of obsidian, we must understand Nahuatl
societies’ linguistic connection to it. In the Florentine Codex the section on obsidian
reads, “it takes its name from itself”124; Sahagún’s seemingly existential phrase is
actually referring to the fact that in the Nahuatl language itztli, the word for obsidian, is
what modern linguists describe as a morpheme. Morphemes are the smallest units of
meaning within a word; for example, the English word “iconify” contains the morphemes
“icon” and “-ify.”125 Other morphemes related to stones are tetl (stone), xiuitl
(turquoise), chalachiuitl (emerald), and tecpatl (flint or sacrificial knife).126
The Nahuatl word for obsidian, itztli, functions as a morpheme that is often used
in words relating to sacrifice, such as: tentitzania (tentli-itztli), a verb that translates as “to
sacrifice and cut ones lips for the idols.”127 The Florentine Codex describes an act called
neçoliztli, which translates to “the bloodying.” Sahagún’s entry reads as, “When they
bloodied themselves, thus did they do it: with an obsidian blade one cut [the lobes of]
one’s ears, and then they let the blood flow from about the ears.”128 This entry is listed
under a section about different Nahua forms of offerings to the gods. The entry directly
links the act of blood letting with obsidian; even the entry header appears to have itztli,
the Nahuatl word for obsidian, as a root. Itztli is also a morpheme associated with words
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that refer to sharpness of cutting edges, such as: tenitztic “something sharp or which has
a cutting edge” and tenitzticayotl “edge, or sharpness of a knife, etc.”129
Obsidian is a remarkable natural material. Obsidian is formed as silica rich lava
that cools quickly with its small crystallites, essentially seedlings from which larger
crystals form, being packed closely together. This close packing and lack of large
crystals gives obsidian its typical jet-black appearance. When fractured its edges have a
smoky luster, becoming clearer and less hazy as it comes to a microscopic edge.130 It is
obsidian’s lack of a crystalline structure that allows it to be knapped into blades that are
the sharpest in the world.131 Experimental archaeology has shown that the edges of
obsidian blades are 500 times sharper than a razor blade as it can fracture down to the last
molecule; this results in points that can penetrate 25% deeper than steel. Obsidian is also
ranked as one of the easiest lithic materials for knappers and lapidaries.132
Obsidian tools were ubiquitous in Mesoamerica, and archaeologist Michael E.
Smith notes that the only material that surpasses obsidian in quantity in archaeological
sites are ceramics. Beyond the physical characteristics that made obsidian popular as
tools, there are about seven natural deposits that were all located in the Mexican
highlands. See maps 6 and 7. The Mexica themselves were located close to two obsidian
sources, Otumba and Pachuca. The latter, Pachuca, is a source of high quality obsidian,
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and as such is better suited for production of prismatic blades.133134
Prismatic blades are made by creating and grinding the bases of the obsidian core,
and occasionally other stones, then using a tool to apply large amounts of pressure to the
edges of the base of the core. This is an advanced form of knapping known as pressure
flaking. The results of this are long thin slivers of obsidian, or prismatic blades, which
have incredibly sharp edges. One obsidian core could produce up to 200 prismatic
blades, which could vary in length with some examples longer than 23 cm. These blades
could then be worked into a variety of tools and weapons. The production of prismatic
blades dates back to the archaic period, approximately 4000 BCE. However, it is not
until the early formative period, an archeological period from 2000 – 700 BCE, that
obsidian prismatic blades were traded all over Mesoamerica.135 Common household
items made from prismatic blades include knives, razors, and blades for sickles.136
Mesoamerican weapons made from obsidian included the famous maquahuitl, a
malicious looking slender cricket paddle fringed with prismatic blades on its two edges.
The maquahuitl was constructed from hard wood to which were glued the prismatic
blades in either contiguous or serrated fashion; the blades could not be removed or
broken. Another intimidating weapon was the tepoztopilli, a thrusting spear whose
diamond shaped point was brimmed with prismatic blades. See fig. 7. The weapons date
back to the Olmecs, 1200-800 BCE, and were used as far south as the Yucatan Peninsula.
Unfortunately, the only extant copies of a maquahuitl and tepoztopilli were destroyed in
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the fire of the Royal Armory of Madrid in 1884.137 Bernal Diaz del Castillo describes the
“arsenals” of Montezuma where he mentions both the maquahuitl and the tepoztopilli:
These arms consisted in shields of different sizes, sabres, and a species of
broadsword [maquahuitl], which is wielded with both hands, the edge
furnished with flint stones, so extremely sharp that they cut much better
than our Spanish swords: further, lances [tepoztopilli] of greater length
than ours, with spikes at their end, full one fathom in length, likewise
furnished with several sharp flint stones. The pikes are so very sharp and
hard that they will pierce the strongest shield, and cut like a razor; so that
the Mexicans even shave themselves with these stones.138
It is unclear what is meant by “sabre” and “pikes” if they other kinds of maquahuitl and
tepoztopilli, or perhaps these words were poorly translated. There were two forms of the
maquahuitl, a one-handed and two-handed variety, which might account for the “sabre”
and “broadsword” confusion. The sword-like maquahuitl was occasionally pointed and
was meant primarily to be a one or two-handed slashing weapon. The pike might be
another kind of tepoztopilli; the one destroyed in the fire was drawn and looks very
different from other depictions of tepoztopilli. See fig. 9. The tepoztopilli was used to
slash and thrust, and its prismatic blades were incredibly effective.139 Bernal Diaz del
Castillo personally attested to their effectiveness saying, “I myself received a heavy
thrust from a lance, which completely pierced my armour, and I should certainly have
lost my life on the spot if my cuirass had not been strongly quilted with cotton.”140
The maquahuitl and tepoztopilli were developed to take advantage of the
incredible sharpness of obsidian. To use these weapons effectively required intensive
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training, especially the maquahuitl. Therefore, the weapons are associated with the
nobility who could afford training. Distance weapons such as the bow and arrow and the
sling were associated with commoners. The battle tactics of Mesoamericans were highly
organized and viewed through a ritual lens. Captives would be taken in warfare to be
ritually slain for the gods.141
One type of sacrifice was known as tlahuahuanaliztli, “gladiatorial sacrifice,” is a
form of sacrifice meant for enemy warriors who were captured early in battle.142 In a
gladiatorial sacrifice the victim would be placed on a raised stone platform to which his
waist was tethered. See fig. 6. He was also given “a war club [maquahuitl] decked with
feathers, not set with obsidian blades.”143 Giving the victim a weapon without obsidian
was essentially neutering him. His ineffective weaponry was in stark contrast to the
warriors fighting him who not only wielded weapons with obsidian, but also performed
ritual dances in which they raised “their obsidian-bladed clubs in dedication to the sun.”
The Mexica warriors would then stand below the captive and attack him. The Mexica
warrior did not want to kill him quickly, but slowly slice him with their obsidian sided
weapons. The act was known as “striping” and was meant to lace the body with blood as
well as display the swordsmanship of the warrior. Once the victim collapsed of blood
loss, his heart was excised, his skin was flayed, and the warrior wore the “striped” flesh
of his victim for a full month of their calendar, or twenty days.144
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When Mesoamericans excised hearts, they used a sacrificial knife known as a
tecpatl. The tecpatl is the namesake of the minor Mesoamerican deity Tecpatl. Artworks
of Tecpatl are knapped flint blades inlaid with white flint teeth and sclera and a black
obsidian pupil See fig. 10.1.145 It is not exactly clear whether or not obsidian was also a
material used for sacrificial knives. Scholar Guilhem Olivier postulates that both
obsidian and flint are integral in sacrifice, but in different ways. Obsidian to him is
reserved for self-sacrifice, such as bloodletting, and flint is for the excision of hearts.
This is because obsidian is associated with atonement and divination and flint is
associated with the sky and its physical ability to spark and make fire.146
The few extant examples of sacrificial knives with their original handles have flint
blades. The handles are commonly depicted as a god or warrior. One existing example
of a sacrificial knife’s handle depicts the sun god Tonatiuh; his hands are portrayed as
holding the flint blade. There is also a depiction of the xiuhcoatl, the fire serpent atlatl
associated with Huitzilopochtli, the Mexica’s main god.147 See fig. 11.2. As mentioned,
Huitzilopochtli became a god of central importance to the Mexica who essentially
replaced Tonatiuh. Huitzilopochtli became the warrior sun god demanding hearts from
victims, and this knife handle depicts this the merging of Tonatiuh with Huitzilopochtli
represented by the iconic weapon, the xiuhcoatl. The knife’s original blade was
unfortunately lost and contemporarily replaced with a flint blade, so it is difficult to draw
further conclusions about this particular artifact.
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Other handles have been found that are more innately adorned in mosaics and are
actually thought to be offerings rather than actual knives used for sacrifice. This is
because plain handled, non-mosaic, knives have been found with victims, while the more
ornate handles were discovered in “offering caches.” One such example of an ornate
handle is of an eagle warrior, who traditionally was part of a warrior class among the
Mexica. See fig. 11.1. This particular eagle warrior is holding a white chalcedony
knapped blade.148 The plain sacrificial knife of Tonatiuh would physically connect its
user to the gods themselves, who through the priests guiding hands would slice open a
captive’s abdomen in order to excise his or her heart. The ornate knife of an eagle
warrior would represent the warrior, through whose bravery in war the captive was taken.
Perhaps as an offering it could potentially be the opposite metaphysical link of the
Tonatiuh sacrificial knife. The ornate knife would connect the warrior to the gods by
representing the warrior holding the white chalcedony blade as an inverse to a god
holding a black obsidian blade. However, these are merely hypothetical meanings of the
eagle warrior effigy knife, since there is no real way to confirm any meaning.
Tezcatlipoca is the god associated with developing the act of heart excision.149 As
mentioned earlier Tezcatlipoca has a close association to Huitzilopochtli. Tezcatlipoca
was often associated with obsidian, partly from his being the black Tezcatlipoca, the
obsidian mirror attached to his foot, his obsidian sandals, and even some obsidian statues
of him. The color black, beyond its association to Tezcatlipoca and obsidian, is a color
important to penance and self-sacrifice. Priests and even occasionally commoners would
paint themselves black with soot as a way to observe some religious practices as well as
148
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to become closer with Tezcatlipoca. Priest-historian Diego Durán mentions that there
was a statue of Tezcatlipoca “made of a shining stone, black as jet, the same stone of
which sharp blades and knives are fashioned.” This is a physical tie between the Lord of
the Smoking Mirror and obsidian. Another tie was the obsidian mirror, which is
associated with divinatory practices; polished obsidian is remarkably reflective. The
“smoking” aspect of the mirror is likely alluding to ways in which the black surface
obfuscates the reflection. The Nahuatl word for one of these mirrors is tezcatl, which
shows a linguistic link to Tezcatlipoca. The obsidian mirror also was a way for
Tezcatlipoca to see people as well as for a person to catch a glimpse of the god.
Furthermore, the mirror was given to the Mexica king, and he could reportedly see the
commoners while they only saw their own reflection.150
Lapidaries comprised a very important artisanal class in Mesoamerica and to the
Mexica. Lapidaries had their own four gods that “they attributed the art [of the lapidary].
Their creations were lip pendants, lip plugs, and ear plugs, ear plugs of obsidian, rock
crystal, and amber; white ear plugs; and all manner of necklaces,” and any other precious
stone jewelries were considered “their creation, their invention.”151 See fig. 10.2 and
10.3. These four gods were Chiconaui itzcuintli, Naualpilli, Macuilcalli, and Cinteotl, and
once a year the lapidaries would have one person represent each of the gods and sacrifice
them in an act of veneration.152
A lapidary used a variety of stones in his craft – from rock crystal, to jade, to
turquoise, to obsidian – but particular focus will be given to the large number of craft
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items created from obsidian. 153 Ear spools, a type of earplugs that resemble spools for
thread, are incredibly thin and delicate and require great expertise to fabricate.154 In the
market place there were sellers who sold finished necklaces, which were of “[worked]
obsidian, of rock crystal, of amethyst, of amber, of black mirror-stone,” obsidian mirror.
The sources are not clear if the seller was in fact the lapidary or just a dealer. But there
were specialized sellers of obsidian and pyrite mirrors who are described in the
Florentine Codex as “the mirror-stone maker [is] a lapidary.”155 See fig. 5.
Lapidaries were fulltime specialists with their own hereditary class who often
made goods directly for nobles or priests. Nobles either consumed these goods for
themselves, using them to display their status and wealth, or they were given as gifts for
other nobles in order to facilitate and strengthen social and political relations. Priests
often used luxury goods in offerings to gods and would bury them in offering caches.
Priests also bought many mosaic works for ceremonial displays. They were often made of
turquoise, shells, and obsidian, which held special religious significance. Commoners
were excluded from purchasing some goods, but there were some items that they could
purchase if they could afford to do so. 156 Only nobles were allowed to wear lip plugs,
ear spools, and nose plugs of precious materials, gold or stone; commoners who were
successful warriors were allowed to wear these items, but they had to be made of wood or
bone.157
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The production of specialized products, which included those of lapidaries,
became increasingly centralized to the city of Tenochtitlan while many of the
surrounding subjugated areas focused more on agriculture. However, one location that
also intensified its production of luxury items was the city-state of Otumba. Otumba
produced various specialty items including textiles, pottery, and lapidary, but again I will
focus on its obsidian production. Otumba is located near a gray obsidian source, but the
majority of the waste and finished obsidian products found there were that from the
higher quality Pachuca obsidian, which has a green coloring. Lapidaries from Otumba
would use cores left over from prismatic blade production. These goods were created for
various levels of “local, regional, and extra-regional elites,” and the objects most
commonly exported were ear spools and labrets.158
Lapidaries’ products were so important to the Mexica that they were able to hold
influence expansion of the Empire. Montezuma II expanded south to conquer the citystates of Tototepec and Quetzaltepec. According to Diego Durán,
“the lapidaries of the city of Tenochtitlan, of Tlatelolco, and of other cities
heard that in the province of Tototepec and Quetzaltepec there existed a
type of sand that was good for working stones, together with emery to
clean them and polish them until they became bright and shining. The
stone workers told King Motecuhzoma about this and explained the
difficulties in and obtaining the sand and emery from that province and the
high prices for that were asked. Motecuhzoma, after consulting with his
council, decided to send envoys to Tototepec and Quetzaltepec to ask as a
favor that this sand be sent to his master lapidaries.”159
Montezuma conquered the two city-states solely to support the craft specialists of the
Empire, specifically those of Tenochtitlan. This demonstrates how important the
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lapidaries’ crafts were to a society heavily focused on the artisanal works to display status
and honor their gods.
As can be seen, luxury goods made of obsidian were highly valued and even
though they were made of a common material, they were regarded just as highly as those
made of jade or gold. Yet the lapidary crafts were only minor consumers of obsidian. It
is important to examine the daily usage and ubiquity of obsidian. Otumba, besides
exporting luxury items of obsidian, also exported prismatic blades, and it was the
remaining cores from prismatic blade production that were then used for luxury craft
production.160 See fig. 8. These finished and semi-finished goods were traded all over the
empire.
Obsidian played a tremendous role in local and long distance commerce. As seen
in Otumba, despite being near its own obsidian source, it used the superior Pachuca
obsidian. Other towns, near their own deposits of obsidian, also opted for Pachuca
obsidian even for simple domestic tools; 90% of the obsidian artifacts found in Nahuatl
sites were of Pachuca obsidian. Under Mexica control, Pachuca obsidian was traded all
over Mesoamerica and even as far as the Yucatan peninsula. The stone was even traded
into the Tarascan Empire, the Triple Alliance’s western enemy. Likewise, goods entered
the Triple Alliance’s Empire despite their hostilities; judging from archeological finds,
merchants crossed imperial borders and traded. 161
Long distance trade like this was carried out by the pochteca, professional
merchants. These merchants were a part of a special class and were organized in special
guilds that only existed in twelve city-states exclusively in the Valley of Mexico, this
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included Tenochtitlan, its sister-city Tlatelolco, and Texcoco. The most economically
active of all these cities were Tlatelolco, Otumba, and Xochimilco. The pochteca would
go on month long trading trips with expert merchants, novices, and porters; all of whom
were expert soldiers armed to defend themselves if necessary. On these trips the
pochteca would trade state goods as well as their own goods. From these merchants
many luxury items came to Tenochtitlan in response to the demand of the nobility. The
pochteca carried only the most expensive and lightest of luxury goods to maximize their
energy expenditure and profits. Pachuca obsidian was among these items.162
Pachuca obsidian had been extensively used by various civilizations such as those
of the city-states of Teotihuacan and Tula, but it was never so exhaustively used as by the
Triple Alliance. During previous civilizations, part-time specialists, who were also
farmers in the local area, did the extraction and knapping of the green obsidian of
Pachuca. However, the Triple Alliance turned part-time labor into full-time work. The
highly organized operation had the workers in a sort of guild. The work was done in
phases rather than one or a few people finding the cores of obsidian and then knapping
them. The labor was not paid, but was part of the tribute demand that Pachuca owed the
Alliance. Despite the distance from Tenochtitlan, 70 km, it was still the most important
source of obsidian for the Alliance, and its quality outweighed the use of closer lower
quality obsidian.163
Laborers needed to find the deposits then tunnel them out to remove them. This
involved creating tunnels sometimes 50 m in depth. Once excavated, the workers of
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Pachuca would create uniform cores and blanks, which could then be fabricated into
various items. Large cores could be used in prismatic blade production or for large
religious items such as vessels. Smaller blanks could be knapped into bifacial knives or
arrowheads. It should be noted that blanks were ten times heavier than the tools
constructed from them. Depleted cores, as mentioned, were then used to produce various
luxury items. The mines had temporary houses built around them, which archaeologists
Alejandro Pastrana and Silvia Domínguez believe were moved when needed to begin
new mineshafts. These settlements were supported with food and tools brought in from
an outside source. Just as the blanks and cores moved along established trade routes
within the empire, so did the food and tool supply for the settlements. The trade of
blanks and cores supplied the craft centers of Tenochtitlan, Tlatelolco, Texcoco, and
Otumba as well as other areas. Controlling and exploiting this Pachuca was of both
strategic and economic importance to the Triple Alliance as its obsidian made their
weapons and tools as well supplied the growing market for status and religious items.164
Perhaps the place where all of the forms of obsidian met was in the market place.
Here lapidaries sold their goods, and porters carried the merchants’ finished and
unfinished obsidian goods. The obsidian seller, itznamacac, is described in the
Florentine Codex as actively making obsidian tools and prismatic blades for his
customers:
“The obsidian seller is one who, [with] a staff with a crosspiece, forces off
[blades; he is] one who forces off [blades], who forces off obsidian blades.
He forces off obsidian blades, he breaks off blades. He sells obsidian,
obsidian razors, blades, single-edged knives, doubled edged knives,
unworked obsidian, scraping stones, V-shaped [pieces].”165
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It was here in the market place that a chinampa farmer could buy prismatic obsidian
blades for a new sickle, a nobleman could purchase ear spools as a gift for a colleague,
and a priest could buy a knife for bloodletting. Obsidian was used in almost every part of
daily life and the tight control of obsidian was important to support the increasing
demand of obsidian as the population of all classes grew. The Triple Alliance increased
both the extraction of obsidian as well as its own borders to keep prices and materials
cheap for knappers, artisans, and consumers. Obsidian’s importance was, more than a
physical material, but also a way to connect with the gods. In fact, after the conquest,
obsidian would be used in religious iconography such as atrial crosses.166
Beyond Saunders claim of the metaphysical and spiritual link to obsidian
stemming from the latent development of metallurgy, obsidian weaponry was developed
and viewed as a part of a complex relationship to nobility, who were the few people that
were taught to use such weapons. Nobility also were the few people who were allowed
to wear obsidian lip, nose, and earplugs. Obsidian’s physical qualities might have also
been contributing factors in the ways in which metals developed in Mesoamerica.
Obsidian, unlike metals, once mined is immediately ready to be worked. Where as the
only metal that this can also be done with is telluric copper, which is a copper occurring
in a natural form that can be cold worked without smelting. Yet copper is a duller and
softer material than obsidian.
Obsidian’s sharpness had been exploited for centuries as past civilizations
developed advanced weaponry based around techniques to exploit this sharpness.
Furthermore, the flowery wars further ingrained these weapons and style of ritual
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fighting. These wars were viewed in religious terms with the most skilled warriors
pairing off fighting with their obsidian weapons and displaying their swordsmanship by
disabling one another in an attempt to capture and sacrifice the opponent. This style of
fighting is the clearest representation of the Mesoamerican view of war as a sacred duel
between equally strong forces to determine whose gods were more powerful and to
provide sacrifices to that god.167 Therefore, obsidian was the material means to prove
oneself and one’s god as the best.
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Chapter Four
Mexican Metallurgy
“Thus I make things beautiful; thus I make things give off rays”
– Florentine Codex168
Metallurgy, traditionally, filled two roles: utilitarian and ornamental. Early
utilitarian developments in metallurgy were in one of three areas: weaponry, transport,
and agricultural tools. Metallurgy for ornamental use was originally relegated to jewelry
and status items. As I have shown in the previous chapter, obsidian filled both of these
roles in Mesoamerica. To understand the use of metals in Mesoamerica I will first
examine the origins of metallurgy in the old world. While the cultural motivations that
spurred this branch of technology have never truly been investigated, the technological
advances in metallurgy often had clear new uses – harder metals held sharper stronger
edges that were used in weaponry, transport, and agricultural tools. Next I will examine
the origin of metallurgy in the Americas, the Andes. Finally, I will examine metallurgy
in Mesoamerica, and how it arrived via cultural diffusion from modern Ecuador to the
Pacific coast of Mesoamerica circa 650 CE. 169
The origins and notable advancements between the various metal ages in the old
world all occurred in the same area, Southwestern Eurasia. The earliest known examples
of true copper smelting comes from Tepe Yahya, Iran. These tools date to approximately
3800 BCE and ushered in the chalcolithic, or copper, age.170 From here true bronzes,
bronze made with tin and copper rather than arsenic (like alloys seen today), stem from
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Mesopotamia. The first known appearance of bronze was an axe head found in a grave
and dated approximately to 2800 BCE, but it is possibly even older.171
Next iron comes into play, possibly created as a waste product of copper smelters
who realized the iron oxides added as a flux, meant to help separate copper from
impurities, were producing a malleable new metal along with the slag at the bottoms of
their furnaces. Actual ironworking does not occur until a little after 1,500 BCE, in the
Anatolian-Iranian region. Originally iron was used for small pieces of jewelry, but when
ironworking techniques improved the metals were immediately applied to the
manufacturing of blades. The Eurasian metallurgic tradition developed harder and
stronger metals that could hold an edge better and were fracture resistant in combat. For
example, if an iron sword was swung and hit a shield it would not break, which was one
of the great advantages of iron weapons over those of bronze.172
Archaeologists assume that the driving force for the advancement of metals was
the perpetual arms race of weapon against armor, piercing versus protection. Next came
metal use in transportation and, later, in agriculture.173 That being said, the cultural
importance of those metals are relatively unstudied and need more scholarly attention.
According to sources, there seems to be an implicit assumption that copper, bronze, and
iron had largely utilitarian values. This, however, is not the case for the Americas.
Anthropologist Heather Lechtman has made important contributions in understanding the
cultural values towards metallurgy in the Andes. Even though metallurgy had different
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values in Mesoamerica, the Andes is where the technology originated and where the first
cultural values in the Americas towards it were formed.
Lecthman not only explores how metallurgy developed but also why it developed.
Andean cultures valued gold and silver as holy materials, each seen, respectively, as the
“‘sweat of the sun’” and the “‘tears of the moon.’” Andean metallurgists had a unique
method of making and casting gold and silver objects that had only coatings of the
precious metals, but this should not be confused with gilding. Copper would be mixed
with a small amount of gold or silver during the smelting process, for example a four to
one ratio. This would create a homogeneous mixture of the metals, and then
metallurgists would treat the surface to remove the copper and create a gold or silver
surface. Lechtman stresses that this was done not solely for the stronger physical
properties of the alloys, but also for the knowledge that the prized metal was present
throughout the material. Although this mixture made the material easier to cast and
work, Lechtman believes it was the knowledge that the precious metal was present
throughout the amalgam was the leading factor in the development of this method.174
Lechtman points to three factors that were detrimental to the advancement of
metallurgy in the Andes: warfare, transportation, and agriculture. Hand to hand combat
in the Andes focused on the crushing power of blunt maces. Maces were often in the
shape of stars and made of stone or bronze. The hardest defense against the mace was a
small wooden shield; otherwise, the mace came against tightly woven cloth armor.
Consequently, the ability of a metal to hold an edge or to be resilient against blows was
not a deciding factor in developing a fitting metal. In contrast, in Mesoamerica the
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opposite was true for their most valued weapons. They developed weapons that had
extremely sharp cutting edges.
As mentioned, obsidian is the sharpest material in the world, and it was this
physical quality that drove technology in Mesoamerican warfare. An obsidian blade
could break if a maquahuitl were to strike another maquahuitl; otherwise, it would come
against cotton armor or wooden shields, which did not seem to affect the blades. A
nobleman in warfare showed his majesty by successfully crippling a warrior and then,
displaying his swordsmanship, delicately slicing an opposing warrior until he collapsed,
and then his heart would be excised. The most successful warrior was, in fact, not the
deadliest on the battlefield, but rather the one capable of crippling and capturing the most
enemies so that they could be sacrificed later. Such a victorious warrior could then
display his success by being granted privileges of dress.175
This style of combat, based around the sharp quality of obsidian, was long
embedded in Mesoamerican warfare. In fact, I postulate that because this style of warfare
was so embedded in the culture that Mesoamericans were likely resistant to replacement
of obsidian weapons with metal ones. Without another culture introducing iron or steel
technology, Mesoamericans could not develop iron weapons on their own, which, while
duller, had the benefit of durability over the delicate obsidian blades. Metallurgy must be
developed in stages, unless the technology was passed through cultural diffusion. The
Americas would have had to develop metallurgy as was done in the old world with the
chalcolithic, bronze, and iron ages. This would mean that the Mesoamericans would
have to undergo duller weaponry, which would clash with ingrained cultural views and

175

Hassig, Aztec Warfare, 37-42, 102.
71

battle tactics. Battle tactics of the Mexica and their neighbors will be discussed in depth
in the following chapter on the Conquest of Mexico.
As for transportation and the invention of the wheel, Stuart Piggott, an
archeologist, offers one hypothesis for its creation by examining the factors for the
invention of the wheel. The criteria necessary for wheel development appears to have
emerged in areas of relatively flat and firm terrain, along with suitable timber, and
domesticated animals “stronger than man.”176 The wheel, which also benefited from
advances in metallurgy, would have little use in the environment of the Andes with its
massive mountainous and rocky terrain and lack of strong animals. In fact, the strongest
animal able to pull a cart was the llama, and adult llama could carry no more than sixty
pounds. 177 The Valley of Mexico is in an even worse position with its own mountainous
terrain, but only having the dog as the largest domesticated animal.178
As for fauna, Piggott sites the domestication of cattle specifically oxen, castrated
bulls, as the solution – domesticated 6000 to 5000 BCE? about 2,000 years earlier than
the invention of the wheel. Additionally, and perhaps more interestingly, he notes that
the first communities to utilize the wheel “were among the first to possess stone axes and
adzes and, soon thereafter, copper and bronze tools suitable for elaborate carpentry.” It
seems that metallurgy is not only important to actually helping to construct lighter and
stronger frames and wheels, but also were important in the fabrication of carts and
wagons. Despite the lack of suitable fauna, Mesoamerica did in fact invent the wheel as
early as 1000 BCE by the Olmecs. However, due to their boggy coastal surroundings
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they lacked the suitable roadbeds for wooden wheels, and their use was reserved only as
the wheels of clay toys. The Olmecs used canoes for most of their transportation needs,
and men could pull skids effectively for their more difficult tasks.179 Lechtman places
agriculture in a close third as an impetus for metallurgy, but again it is of little
significance for its development in Mesoamerica. As mentioned in the agricultural
section, Mesoamericans developed a form of intercropping built around the digging stick
and seeds were planted individually, often in mounds. This system is incompatible with
the plow, and while metallurgy helps with a digging stick, it does not have the same
incentive for develop as a metal plow would. Plow agriculture is meant to slice into the
land and churn soil. Whereas, Mesoamerican agriculture was designed to be selfsufficient, with the plants mimicking natural cycles. The only agricultural tool that
received a significant advantage from metallurgy was the blade of a hoe, but no
significant advances came from it. As with transport, perhaps the largest hindrance to
metallurgy was the lack of domesticated animals. That is while there are examples of the
man pulled plows in the old world, there is less motivation to form this technology
without an animal to pull it, similar to conundrum of the cart.180
Mesoamerica followed in the Andean footsteps of having metals that mimic the
quality of precious metals in color; however, the advances in Mesoamerica did so by
unique techniques. To understand why these techniques developed , one must first
investigate how Mesoamericans, specifically the Nahuas, viewed metals. To the Nahuas,
gold and silver were the excrement, specifically diarrhea from the Sun. The word for
gold derives “from [the fact that] sometimes, in some places, there appears in the dawn
179
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something like a bit of diarrhea. They named it ‘the excrement of the sun’; it was very
yellow, very wonderful, resting like an ember, like molten gold.”181 The Nahuatl word
for gold is cuztic teocuitlatl, which translates literally to “‘yellow divine excretions’” and
the word for silver is iztac teocuitatl, which translates literally to “‘white divine
excretions.’”182 Thus the word that comes before teocuitatl, cuztic or iztac, determines to
which substance it is referring.
Archaeologist Dorothy Hosler has interpreted silver as being the excrement of the
moon; however, in the Florentine Codex silver is listed in the section on gold in the
chapter that “telleth of all the metals in the earth.” In the gold section, gold is listed as
“the yellow” and silver as the “the white”; the Nahuas only make the distinction in color,
but they do not do the same for the other properties of the two metals.183 It seems that the
Nahuas did not make the distinction of them being two separate metals, but only a
variation of the same metal. The Nahuatl word for mica is metzcuitlatl, which comes
from the words meztli meaning moon and cuitatl meaning excrement. Nahuas believed
that mica was the excrement of the moon, not silver. They also seem to have considered
that mica was a metal, since it was placed in the same metal section in the Florentine
Codex as gold. However, both gold and silver were sacred, even the words for them
convey this meaning, and like the Andean cultures they sought to mimic the visual
properties of precious metals in their metallurgic technologies.
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Neither the Mexica nor any other Nahua group were premier metal smiths in
Mesoamerica; the Tarascans were.184 The Tarascan state is situated on the western coast
of Mexico, and was on the northwest border of the Triple Alliance’s Empire. The
Tarascans were fierce enemies of the Mexica; the Tarascan city of Tzintzuntzan was the
Carthage to the Mexica’s Rome, Tenochtitlan.185 The Tarascans were the cultural
inheritors of the copper and bronze metallurgists. The first Mesoamerican smithies began
smelting copper around 650 CE; they learned copper-smelting techniques from the
peoples of what is now Ecuador. Traders from Ecuador made balsa rafts and travelled
along the western side of Central America, and Western Mexico was an important stop.
Western Mexico was the only place that spondylus oyster grows; the shells of this
particular spiny bivalve were highly prized in Ecuador. Judging from the artifacts found
in both Western Mexico and Ecuador, it appears that the copper objects were traded and
then the skills of metallurgy were learned by cultural diffusion. The budding
coppersmiths in Mexica mimicked the goods received through trade with Ecuadorians,
and made similar but distinctly Mesoamerican second-generation items. Meaning that
they had unique chemical properties that occurred from using local copper sources .186
Bronze and coppersmiths were primarily focused on the colors of the metal items
they made because they were trying to replicate gold and silver colors. This was
achieved through bronzes that used levels of tin or arsenic in higher than necessary
levels, which would change the color of the resulting bronzes; typically metalworkers
used somewhere around between five and twenty percent of the alloying metals. The
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effect, depending on the increasing concentration, would change from red to gold to
silver. There are a smaller number of utilitarian objects that used lower levels of arsenic
or tin that created strong bronzes, but did not alter color. Because the finds of utilitarian
objects to those of ceremonial or status objects are much smaller it seems that this was
not the focus of metal development.187
The main focus of metallurgy in Mesoamerica was the production of colored, well
sounding bells. Even though the Tarascans were the predominant metal workers, their
techniques were also used in many areas that the Mexica controlled. These two
kingdoms had very similar religious and cultural practices, even overlapping gods –
Tlaloc, Xipe Totec, and Quetzalcoatl. And in both societies bells were used for
ceremonial practices, protection in war, and status among the upper class.188189
Bells were used in various religious activities with the gods, Tlaloc (the god of
rain), Xipe Totec (the god of agriculture and goldsmiths), Quetzalcoatl (the god of wind
and knowledge), Huitzilopochtli (the god of war, the Mexica, and the sun) are among a
few gods whose rituals are characterized with bells.190 For the Mexica, bells,
counterintuitively, provided protection in warfare. This practice stemmed from the myth
in which Huitzilopochtli’s brothers wore bells when they went to war against him and
were quickly slaughtered. Perhaps it was a way of mimicking Huitzilopochtli who right
before the battle “just then was born” and only had a shield and magical atlatl.191 After
slaying his brothers, he “he took their finery” and he “appropriated them” and
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“incorporated them into his own destiny” making them apart of his own “insignia.”
Perhaps warriors were paying more reverence to Huitzilopochtli’s accomplishments than
wearing them as protection.192
While bells were an important focus of Mesoamerican metallurgy and were often
made of bronze, they were meant to mimic gold and silver, and they are actual examples
of gold and silversmithing. The making of bronze bells was the specialty of Western
Mexico; however, the Mexica were adept gold and silversmiths. Perhaps their skill came
from immigrant Mixtecs, an ethnic group from southwest Mexico, but, nevertheless,
Tenochtitlan had adroit smiths. They used the lost wax method to cast lip, nose, and
earplugs along with bells, pendants, and many other kinds of jewelry. Like the lapidaries,
smiths were organized into their own class-like structure of the calpulli, and also like
lapidaries, much of their work was made directly for nobles because only the nobility was
allowed to wear gold or silver ornaments.193
So as we’ve seen, metal was not the material for tools or warfare, which perhaps
has led to the incorrect belief that the Mexica were still in the Stone Age. The Mexica
were in fact in the “Bronze Age.” However, their “Bronze Age” is dissimilar to the
Eurasian Bronze Age. In contrast to Eurasia, the Mexica, and many other
Mesoamericans, used obsidian for their tools. In fact it has been so commonly used that
it has been known as the “steel of Mesoamerica.” However, obsidian was much more
than a utilitarian material. Obsidian held important prominence in the ranking of social
status; it was associated with gods; and it was the material that used in sacrifice, the
ultimate tribute to the gods. Having examined the technologies and advances of
192
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Mesoamerica, and the Mexica in particular, the next chapter will explore how these
cultural and environmental impacts on technology and society played out in the contact
between the Old and New Worlds.
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Chapter Five
New Arrivals
“‘Are we among enemies?’” – Codex Aubin194
In this chapter I will examine the contact between Europeans and the Triple
Alliance, and Cortés’ travel to and expulsion from Tenochtitlan. I have relied on Hugh
Thomas’ narrative account of the conquest for many of the details because of his
thoroughness; I have struggled to find another scholarly account that examines the
Conquest in such detail. While Thomas’ account is amazingly thorough and a pleasure to
read, he relies mainly on Spanish sources and is writing from their perspective. This is
partially from the paucity of Mexica sources about the conquest compared to the
Spaniards. However, my work is an attempt to understand the events from an indigenous
standpoint, consequently, I also draw on insights of the Conquest from Inga Clendinnen
and Camilla Townsend.
On April 20, 1519 Hernán Cortés landed off the shore of what is today, Veracruz.
He had three distinct advantages: advanced technology, diseases, and two interpreters,
Gerónimo de Aguilar and Malintzin. (Cortés had other interpreters, but they were largely
ineffective; I will discuss them in more detail later.) Aguilar was a Spaniard enslaved by
the Chontal Maya for eight years after he had the misfortune of being shipwrecked off the
coast of the Yucatán. Malintzin was an indigenous woman, originally a Southern Nahua,
who also was a slave to the Chontal Maya. These two interpreters would translate from
Spanish, to Chontal Mayan (a dialect of Mayan) to Nahuatl (Malintzin spoke a southern
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dialect of Nahuatl, but could still communicate with the Mexica).195 Some historians
claim that these interpreters allowed the Spaniards to triumph on August 13, 1521, when
Cuauhtémoc, the last tlatoani of the Mexica, forcibly surrendered to Cortés.
Throughout my examination of the Conquest I will assess not only the previously
three mentioned advantages of Cortés, but also the cultural misunderstandings that
compounded one another throughout the Conquest. I believe it was these cultural
differences and misinterpretations that gave Cortés the largest advantage. I will first give
a brief account of the first half of the Conquest of Mexico. The Conquest can be divided
into two parts: The first half of the Conquest extends from Cortés leaving Cuba, in
February 18, 1519, until the Noche Triste, his expulsion from Tenochtitlan on June 30,
1520. The Noche Triste is both the end of the first half and beginning of the second half
of the Conquest of Mexico. I make this distinction because the first half is largely devoid
of combat. In fact, until the Noche Triste, Cortés never fought the Triple Alliance or even
the Mexica themselves. There are some minor skirmishes with the Tlaxcalans, the
Massacre of Cholula, but none of these conflicts brought Cortés against an Alliance
army.
The first half of the Conquest is important because it marked Montezuma’s
attempt to understand who Cortés was and what his purpose and intent was. Montezuma
struggled to understand who these foreign people were, what they wanted, what they
were capable of, and whether they were friend or foe. Cortés, arguably, was in a better
position, his nation and people were not in any danger, and while there were certainly
high personal risks, there was also the possibility of great rewards. He was an outsider
195
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from an unknown place guided only by interpreters for his basic insight into a foreign
culture. Even though Cortés was hardly tactful with the foreign cultures he encountered,
he had to only look for weaknesses in what he quickly learned was an Empire full of
unhappy city-states. While the Mesoamericans were more advanced than the
Amerindians of the Caribbean, Cortés knew he had a technological military advantage.
For the first half of the Conquest, technology was only an advantage in that it kept him
and his men alive, rather than making the Spaniards an unstoppable force.
The first half of the Conquest culminated in the drawing of sides, and there would
no longer be any ambivalence about the Spaniards. The Mexica knew that the Spaniards
were not ambassadors but solely enemies. However, this knowledge cost the Mexica
almost all of the political power they held over the Empire and culminated in the drawing
of sides. I will examine the events of Cortés’ arrival and travel to Tenochtitlan, and
attempt to glimpse the reasons for Montezuma’s actions.
The second half of the conquest is important in that while the Spaniards suffered a
terrible military loss, they maintained the advantage as they were forced into indigenous
politics. In addition, they fought not only with European weapons, but also a European
view of war. This was an immense factor in the second half of the conquest; others
included the indigenous view of weapons and combat, the effects of a smallpox out break
shortly after the Noche Triste, and finally the way in which Cortés took advantage of the
indirect rule of the Triple Alliance Empire.
On February 18, 1519, Hernán Cortés left Cuba with ten ships on the third
exploration of the Yucatán with approximately 530 soldiers (thirty of whom had
crossbows and twelve with harquebuses, a musket common of the time), sixteen horses,
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and fourteen artillery pieces. Cortés also had with him four Indian interpreters, all given
Spanish names – or at least nicknames, who were captured in a previous expedition to the
Yucatán. They were, “Old Mechor,” “little Julián,” “Pedro Barbara,” and a boy renamed
“Francisco.” “Old Mechor” and “little Julián” spoke Chontal Maya and some Spanish;
Pedro Barbara spoke both Yucatec and Chontal Maya, but had a limited knowledge of
Spanish, and “Francisco” spoke Nahuatl, but not until later in the Conquest did he learn
enough Spanish to be useful as an interpreter. However, all of these interpreters would
be play only a minor role, once Cortés had Aguilar and Malintzin the other interpreters
would not be needed.196
From Cuba, Cortés headed for Cozumel, a large island off the east coast of the
Yucatán Peninsula. Here the locals told him that there were two Spaniards living on the
Peninsula, and Cortés set forth to find them in hopes of having native speakers of
Castilian. To repair a ship’s hull from rot, Cortés and crew stopped at what they called
the “Isla de Mujeres” (the Island of Women) and sent a small crew of men to in search of
the two Spaniards on the mainland. Around March 12, 1519, a canoe from the mainland,
carrying three people, approached Cortés and his men. To the Spaniards’ surprise, one
man spoke Spanish.197 It was Gerónimo de Aguilar; in fact he looked so much like an
Amerindian in appearance and dress that when “Cortés beheld the man in this attire, he,
as all the rest of us had done, asked Tapia where the Spaniard was? When Geronimo
heard this, he cowered down after the Indian fashion, and said: “‘I am he.’”198
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Aguilar would constitute the first half of Cortés’ translating duo. He was
shipwrecked off the coast of the Yucatán in 1511 with a few other Spaniards; only he and
Gonzalo Guerrero, a fellow crewman, had survived. They became slaves of the Maya,
and while Guerrero assimilated and started a family with a Mayan woman, Aguilar
refused and remained at heart, if not in appearance, a Spaniard. Aguilar was freed when
he had received a letter sent by Cortés’ scouting party, and, unable to convince Guerrero
to join; he left for the coast to find salvation from his servitude. Aguilar, for much of the
early conquest, was invaluable as an interpreter. He was likely fluent in Chontal Mayan
having been a slave with them for eight years; in fact, he had initially had difficulty
speaking Spanish upon joining the expedition.199
With one half of arguably the world’s most famous translator duo, Cortés sailed
westward hugging the coast of the Yucatán, soon to complete the other half. Around
March 22, 1519, Cortés arrived off the coast of the Chontal Mayan city-state Potonchan,
in what is today part of the Mexican State of Tabasco. Cortés landed with a few men and
demanded provisions from the Maya of Potonchan. It is not clear if Aguilar had at this
point effectively replaced the original two Mayan translators, but all three were present.
The locals were hesitant and fled to the surrounding woods. After a day or so the Mayans
gave Cortés some food and gold, but they claimed this was all their food and that the
Spaniards should leave or else they would be killed by their warriors. Cortés refused and
demanded more supplies. Relations soured after several days, and Cortés sent out 250
men divided into three groups to explore the land for supplies. Mayan warriors engaged
one of these groups, leading to two days of skirmishes. Finally, with sixty Spaniards
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wounded, an estimated 200 Mayans killed, and the desertion of their translator the “Old
Mechor,” the Mayans sued for peace. The Spaniards were given around twenty women
including Malintzin, the second half of the translating duo.200
Information surrounding Malintzin’s origins are foggy at best. The only account
of her origins comes from Bernal Diaz, who calls her, “a lady of distinction, the daughter
of a powerful cazique [the Taino word for ruler, which the Spaniards used as a blanket
term for chief or ruler] and a princess who had subjects of her own.” He goes on to state
that after her father’s death, while Malintzin was just a child, she was sold into slavery, as
her mother wanted her half-brother to inherit the land.201 It is impossible to know
whether or not Malintzin’s father was a tlatoani or not, but she was from Jaltipan, a citystate south of what is today Vera Cruz. As a child, her age unknown to scholars, she was
sold into slavery and ended up in Potonchan. Scholar Anna Lanyon believes that, as she
lived and learned Chontal Mayan, she was taught womanly duties, such as weaving, until
the age of fourteen when she would have become a concubine. At around the age of
eighteen or nineteen she was given to Cortés.202 And, although Malintzin would learn
enough Spanish to eventually replace Aguilar, the famous translator duo was now
complete.
These two translators would be the only ones that Cortés relied on for the rest of
the conquest because of their superior quality in translating. Aguilar was a native speaker
of Spanish, and Malintzin was a native speaker of Nahuatl, and both learned Yucatec
Maya fluently. Therefore, the other indigenous translators were ineffective because
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either they did not know Nahuatl or, in the case of “Francisco,” they did know enough
Spanish to be useful.
While the two translators were incredibly important to the conquest, their
translating abilities need to be assessed. Malintzin and Aguilar were effective in basic
translating, but it is unclear how effective they were at conveying ideas and cultural
insights. Specifically, Malintzin’s effectiveness as a cultural insider needs to be assessed.
Malintzin, despite her royalty, was still a slave and a woman; this means that her
understandings of political protocols and customs, which were affairs reserved to male
nobility, would be limited. Furthermore, it is unclear how much her royalty had helped
her in understanding the political customs of elites, as she was only a child when she was
sold; the exact age remains a mystery. Therefore, it seems that her political knowledge
and diplomatic skills would be slight. Aguilar, being a slave to a Chontal Mayan lord,
was no better off in understanding such procedures. Historian Inga Clendinnen believes
this is why Cortés saw the diplomatic acts of gift giving of Montezuma as signs of
submission rather than in the Mesoamerican tradition as a display of power because it
was never explained to him otherwise.203
Furthermore, Malintzin, being from the southern extremity of the Triple
Alliance’s Empire, spoke a dialect of Nahuatl, which would have made the chain of
communication between Nahuatl, Chontal Maya, and Spanish more difficult an
endeavor.204 Clendinnen argues that the “daisy chain” of translation created a struggle to
force cultural concepts through unfamiliar languages.205 It, therefore, seems doubtful that
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Cortés held the upper hand by having translators; rather, it placed him on a more equal
footing now that he could communicate with locals. Gestures between Amerindians and
Europeans would remain difficult to grasp for both sides.
On 17 April 1519 Cortés and his fleet left Potonchan and arrived three days later
off the coast of what would become modern day Veracruz; the Vera Cruz Cortés founded
was a bit farther north than today’s. On the day he arrived, his fleet was greeted by a
canoe of Nahuatl speakers who historian Hugh Thomas believes not to be locals. This is
likely the case because the Amerindians that lived on the coast where Cortés had
anchored were Totonacs, and while living under Mexica rule these people did not speak
Nahuatl.206 It is likely Cortés’ first contact was with the watchmen whom Montezuma
had stationed along the Gulf Coast after a Spanish ship was first spotted in 1517.207
According to Durán’s History, Montezuma even had the sighting from 1517 drawn and
recorded.208 It would seem that Montezuma was worried about newcomers even before
Cortés’ arrival.
The Totonacs treated Cortés well, and on Easter Sunday, April 24, 1519,
emissaries of Montezuma met with Cortés. The two explained who they were; Cortés
claimed he was an ambassador of King Charles V of Spain. It is dubious if they believed
this, as both the emissaries and Montezuma already knew of the skirmishes at Potonchan.
Either way, gifts were exchanged; the Mexica meant to show the splendor of their
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tlatoani, but Cortés saw it only as goodwill.209 Cortés displayed the pinnacle of Spanish
military might and fired his cannons. Unsurprisingly for people who have never seen
such a weapon, the emissaries fell to the ground in fright. The emissaries recorded the
number of men and “deer” (horses) through their pictographic writing system and
returned to Tenochtitlan.210
As the weeks passed, Velázquez de León and other members of the expedition
who were allies to Diego Velázquez, the Governor of Cuba who had funded the
expedition, wanted Cortés to return to Cuba. In order to prevent mutiny Cortés needed to
validate his actions. Technically, Cortés was only under orders to explore the coast of the
Yucatán, look for a river that could potentially lead to China or India, and search for the
explorer Grijalva. The latter request is particularly confusing because Grijalva was not
lost. The arguments for return were that Cortés had completed his contract, freed a
Spaniard, and amassed some gold. Furthermore, from explorations inland, the Spaniards
encountered evidence of human sacrifice that made them reluctant to stay. On the 7th of
June, 1519, to avoid returning to Cuba and to free himself from the contract, Cortés
moved northward up the coast and found la Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz.211 La Villa Rica
de la Vera Cruz was officially founded on June 28, 1519, while the supporters of
Governor Velázquez were away on an expedition. Cortés did this to exploit a loophole
and have himself elected by his men as the town’s Chief Justice and Captain. Thus, he
was no longer under orders from Governor Velázquez, just King Charles V, and could
pursue, unrestrained, a new plan to venture to Tenochtitlan.
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All along the journey to Vera Cruz, Cortés had encountered Totonacs
complaining of the tribute demands from the Triple Alliance; he would use this as a
justification to make some political blunders. While visiting a Totonac town, Cortés
encountered Mexica bureaucrats who were collecting tribute. He had the tax collectors
arrested by the Totonacs, and then he secretly freed two. He told the two that he did so to
save their lives from the Totonacs, and that he was a friend of Montezuma and had them
relay that message to the tlatoani himself.212 Perhaps Cortés thought of himself as clever
for displaying “friendship” towards Montezuma and the tax collectors, but he
unknowingly declared an act of war against the Triple Alliance. Refusal to pay tribute
was akin to a declaration of war in Mesoamerica. According to Inga Clendinnen, after
Cortés released the remaining tax collectors the chief of the town lied and sent Cortés and
his men after phantom Mexica warriors in order to remain in good standing with the
Triple Alliance.213
Cultural misunderstanding continued as Cortés returned from the fruitless venture.
The Spaniards passed through the village of Cempoallan, where the locals further assured
the Spaniards that there was evidence of the phantom Mexica warriors. Conquistador
Bernal Diaz claims that when they reached the town they were told that there was a
“Mexican garrison in their township, which, however, had returned home.”214 Cortés
perhaps feeling emboldened by the non-combat and his deep sense of religiosity preached
conversion and had his men tear “down the idols from their pediments, broke them to
pieces, and flung them piecemeal down the steps.” This caused a great commotion and
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almost led to a battle as natives began to shoot arrows at the Spaniards. Ultimately the
chieftain stopped the skirmish. 215 Cortés subsequently whitewashed the broken idols’
temple and replaced them with a cross. Cortés’ actions, in a way, mimicked the ways
that victory was declared in Mesoamerica. A city-state was defeated when its temple was
burned and idols destroyed thereby signifying that the local deities had lost. The Mexica
would on occasion take idols from the conquered people for themselves.216 Vaguely,
Cortés had conquered Cempoallan and once again mimicked cultural cues that were
unknown to him.
Around August 16, 1519, Cortés set out westward with 300 conquistadors (with
about forty crossbowman and twenty harquebusiers), fifteen horses, and three small
cannons. See map 8. Many of the men had donned light but tight woven cotton armor
worn by natives. 800 Totonacs helped to carry all sorts of supplies along with the
cannons.217 His plan was simple: to either “take him [Montezuma] alive in chains or
make him subject to” Charles V of Spain. Cortés would change his mind as he suspected
the Mexica of treachery and wrote, “now I intended to enter his land at war doing all the
harm I could as an enemy, though I regretted it very much, for I had always wished rather
to be his friend and ask his advice on all things that must be done in this land.”218 This
statement, according to Townsend, is part of Cortés’ legal rhetoric to justify his actions
because King Charles could only gain territory if it was justifiable.219
Along the way, Cortés and his men were brought through Tlaxcala. The territory
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that was under the control of a loose federation of small Tlaxcalan and Otomí city-states
that was similar to the Triple Alliance. This area is commonly referred to as Tlaxcala,
taking its name from its dominant city-state. Cortés initially sent native emissaries to
Tlaxcala to ask for their aid against the Triple Alliance, but they never returned. Despite
this, Cortés set forth, but he and his men were attacked by a large number of Tlaxcalan
warriors, perhaps numbering in the thousands. They killed two horses, but the Spaniards
killed between sixteen and sixty, leading the Tlaxcalans to retreat. Over the next several
days, as the Cempoallan guides tried to assuage the Tlaxcala to side with Cortés, the
Spaniards fought various skirmishes with both Tlaxcalans proper and Otomí warriors.
Montezuma had sent emissaries to the Spaniards who advised them against going to the
city of Tlaxcala and watched the Spaniards in battle. Cortés lost between forty-five and
fifty-five Spaniards and at least three horses, and in one instance a horse was captured for
sacrifice. Cortés almost died from injuries and a subsequent fever. This did not stop
Cortés from burning villages and killing their inhabitants. 220
On September 18, 1519, Cortés and his men peacefully entered the city of
Tlaxcala. They knew that if it were not for their Totonac allies, they would have been
killed, so they must have been thankful to have new indigenous allies. Montezuma’s
emissary, still with Cortés, urged him not believe the Tlaxcalans, and to head to the city
of Cholula where he would be well received. The Tlaxcalans, in turn, told Cortés that
this was a trap, and that the city was secretly preparing to slaughter them. Cholula
ambassadors came to Tlaxcala to assure Cortés that this was not the case and invited him
to their city. On October 12, Cortés and his expedition set out for Cholula with their new
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Tlaxcalan allies in toe. The Spaniards were, by all accounts, well fed; however, after a
few days the Tlaxcalans convinced Cortés that the Cholulans had set a trap for them.
Cortés asked to meet with the Cholulan nobles in a courtyard. A hundred or so, unarmed,
amassed in the courtyard, and Cortés, locking them inside, confronted them about the
conspiracy. They promptly confessed to it as a plot devised by the Montezuma and that
20,000 warriors were waiting along the road to the Mexico to attack the Spaniards. Cortés
took this as license to execute all of them and destroy the city. Cortés estimated that
3,000 people were killed as the Spaniards and their allies sacked the city for two days.
Cholula was an important city sitting just outside the Valley of Mexico; it was one of the
oldest cities with its population second only to Tenochtitlan, an estimated 180,000
people. 3,000 people seems too small a figure for two full days of sacking. The city was
razed, destroying many of its hundreds of temples.221
Historian Hugh Thomas insists that there were the inklings of an impending attack
on the Spanish. 222 This is doubtful because there was no resistance, which would be
expected if the city were preparing for to attack. The Mexica warriors, just like the
resistance, never materialized. Inga Clendinnen believes that the trap was a ruse by the
Tlaxcalans to, with the aid of their new Spanish allies, attack an enemy city. She also
believes Cortés had done so to raise the morale of soldiers who had realized their
vulnerability at the hands of Amerindians in their fights against the Tlaxcalans.223 She is
likely right in both cases, and the supposed planned attack on Cortés was just as fake as
the warriors Cortés chased after he arrested the tax collectors.
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The emissaries of Montezuma witnessed the destruction of Cholula, and were
forced to send a message to Montezuma asking for a meeting between him and the
conquistador. Despite his reservations, Montezuma could no longer delay the meeting.
Cortés departed Cholula, and besides a Maginot Line-like defense on a trail that Cortés
routed and a Montezuma impersonator who Cortés realized was the real tlatoani, Cortés
was unimpeded in arriving at Tenochtitlan. On November 8, 1519 Cortés and
Montezuma met; the usual gift giving and pleasantries were exchanged. Cortés, his men,
and allies were invited over the causeway into the city.224
Later, in a famous exchange between Cortés and Montezuma, Montezuma called
the Spaniards gods and willingly became a “vassal” to Charles V. However, this account
of events is hotly debated. Camilla Townsend has analyzed the writings of the native
accounts and compared them to the Spanish accounts and has found that the reason the
Spaniards are called gods is two fold. First, the natives called people based on their citystate, ethnicity, or position, had no word to call the Spaniards since their native land,
ethnic group, and position was unknown. Second, the word for god was not as definite as
it is in Spanish, and had a broad connotation including demons and god-impersonator,
such as those in ritual killings.225 Furthermore, it has been shown that the notion that
Montezuma thought that Cortés was the god Quetzalcoatl returning to Mexico was a
post-conquest construction immortalized in the Florentine Codex.226 Montezuma’s
emissaries witnessed the Spaniards fight and die against Tlaxcalans, information he
would have received. Mortals make for weak gods.
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The matter of accepting to be the “vassal” of Charles V is also unbelievable, and
it appears to be a complex form of miscommunication that stemmed from the problem of
translation. Inga Clendinnen notes that at the time there did not seem to be a translation
of vassal because politics in Mesoamerica did not work in such a fashion.227 Cortés also
misinterpreted indigenous hospitality and abused it. Cortés receiving gifts and meeting
with local leaders was part of his treatment as a guest of honor of the Mexica, not as a
head of state.228229 Furthermore, it has been shown that had Cortés been in control during
the entirety of his stay then he would have made his success known. Instead he did
nothing until he heard from Narváez, and only then did he arrest Montezuma, which will
be discussed later.230
The immediate question is why had Montezuma allowed for the Spaniards to
arrive safely at his city? Why did he not confront them on the coast? Why did he let
them pass through his Empire? Inga Clendinnen cautions against reading too deeply into
Montezuma’s actions, remarking, “Much of Montezuma’s conduct must remain
enigmatic.” She explains that this caution and permanent uncertainty is because all of the
sources have a bias against him, and that none of them could accurately portray his
thinking process for his decisions. The Florentine Codex was written using native
interviewers who, while being witnesses of the Conquest, were too young to have been in
Montezuma’s close circle of advisors. Diego Durán’s History goes further in
misinterpreting, and has Montezuma immediately imprisoned by Cortés after their first
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meeting.231 Spanish accounts conflict over how much power Montezuma maintained
while captive. It seems that Montezuma was in full control of his Empire from
November 1519 to May 1520. Cortés claimed that Montezuma voluntarily relinquished
the Empire to Charles V, which has been shown as legal justification for Cortés’ actions
because Charles V could only have gained territory through just war or voluntary
submission. Cortés used the notion that he and his men were gods returning to take over
the Empire as another attempt to show that Montezuma voluntarily submitted his
Empire.232
However, we can still make some basic assumptions about Montezuma and his
actions. While Cortés was gallivanting through Alliance territory – proselyting, forging
relationships with natives, advancing towards Tenochtitlan, and gathering information
along the way – Montezuma, too, was gathering intelligence. Montezuma’s emissaries
recorded military information about the Spaniards in their meeting, and Montezuma had
messengers in every town Cortés and his men visited.233 This should not be seen as a
surprise, as mentioned earlier, merchants’ roles in Mesoamerica included spying.
Montezuma had ordered messengers stationed along all the roads so that he could be told
of news without delay.234 In fact, after the Massacre of Cholula, Spanish notes
accompanying the Florentine Codex indicate that these information channels were
flooded as Montezuma’s “messengers came to tell him of them [the massacre]; the whole
road was full of messengers.”235
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The following are some assumptions we can make about Montezuma as a ruler.
Montezuma was an experienced general when he was unanimously elected tlatoani; the
reasons given was that his “advice and decisions were always correct, especially in
matters of war.”236 His utmost concern, as shown, was gathering information as any
experienced general and ruler, having governed for twenty-seven years, would have done.
He had all towns, on “pain of death,” provide provisions for Cortés and his men.237 This
is likely because Cortés had repeatedly claimed to be an ambassador with peaceful
intentions. Mesoamericans took the treatment of ambassadors very seriously, which
might explain the initial kindness and provisions from Montezuma.238 Yet it is unlikely
that Montezuma believed Cortés was an ambassador. The combination of the news from
the fighting in Potonchan, the arresting of tax collectors, the pseudo-conquest of
Cempoallan, and the massacre at Cholula would belie Cortés’ true intentions.
Furthermore, Cortés’ insistence on seeing Montezuma’s “face,” which could only be seen
by his closest family members, makes for another cultural ambiguity that would be
difficult for the ruler to interpret. Finally, war in Mesoamerica was a sacred contest, and
the inequality of provisions would spoil the sacred results of such a conflict.239
Therefore, Montezuma likely also supplied Cortés expedition with staples during their
stay in his land, so if there were a fight it would be a fair one.
The Spaniards, when they arrived off the coast, were an entirely new people and
potential enemy. Reports trickling in from the Yucatán, before Cortés made landfall,
must have been unnerving, first because of the casualties of Potonchan, and second
236

Durán, History of the Indies, 389.
Ibid., 511.
238
Thomas, Conquest, 177.
239
Clendinnen, “Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty,” 71, 78.
237

95

because the reports’ potential unreliability and novelty. In Cortés’ first meeting with
Montezuma’s emissaries, he had his men in battle formation displaying their arms, the
horses, and the cannons. The display as a show of military force would not have been
lost on Montezuma; however, he did not yet know of how the new weapons and soldiers
would fare in battle. Hugh Thomas mentions that a Mexica guide might have tricked
Cortés expedition to Tenochtitlan by bringing the Spaniards through Tlaxcala so that they
would be killed. The Tlaxcalans themselves remark that if Montezuma was responsible
for sending the Spaniards through their territory he was also responsible for saving them
from destruction.240
It is possible Montezuma did this so that he could simultaneously gain important
reconnaissance about the Spaniards as well as weaken them if not annihilate them.
Montezuma knew the fighting abilities of Tlaxcala, and this plan would be a far better
yardstick to judge the Spaniards by than the distant battle of Potonchan and some cannon
shots in front of his emissaries. While under attack by the Tlaxcalans and Otomí,
Montezuma’s emissaries watched the Spaniards in battle. They advised Cortés not to
trust the Tlaxcalans.241 Could Montezuma’s hope of the Spaniards’ destruction have
come unraveled?
Perhaps it did, and Montezuma realized the folly of his decision to have his old
enemies battle and test the mettle of his new ones. Montezuma, like any other Mexica,
knew that his city’s rise to power over Azcapotzalco was one in which various powers of
the Valley and beyond came together to end Tepanec rule. Upon the flood of information
about the massacre of Cholula, Montezuma must have seen the irony: By trying to have
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his enemies eliminate each other and buy time to learn more of the Spaniards, he had
united an ambitious and ferocious city-state with an outside power. The significance of
Cholula’s sacking is hard to understate, yet its impact is rarely touched on in accounts of
the conquest. It was the first joint conquest between Cortés and Tlaxcala. Still, after the
massacre and sacking of Cholula, Cortés claimed to be an ambassador only seeking
friendship and amiability with Montezuma. Even if Montezuma never did claim Cortés
intentions to be otherwise, the idea that Montezuma saw Cortés as peaceful is laughable.
The unjustified slaughter and destruction of such a large city with the aid of your bitter
enemies is a sign of aggression that communicates itself across any cultural boundary.
Montezuma could not stop Cortés from coming to Tenochtitlan, and was
presented with a dilemma of whether or not to allow him into the city. His options for
war were limited as the month of November was an important time for harvests, leaving
peasants, who would constitute the majority of his army, unavailable.242 In addition,
Montezuma at this point gathered enough military intelligence to know that the cost of
fighting an open field battle against the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans would have been
militarily and politically disastrous. Camilla Townsend believes that had Montezuma
fought them he would have faced major political upheaval. There would have been a
high amount of casualties just a causeway away from the perceived indomitable city.
Other city-states would have seen even a victorious battle as a sign of Mexica weakness
and seized upon it.243 Furthermore, had Montezuma allowed Cortés to continue to
explore the Valley and its city-states, he would have allowed Cortés to potentially seize
upon internal dissatisfaction with the Mexica. Montezuma had already seen Cortés gain
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the favor of the Tlaxcalans; the idea that he could have free rein over the Valley would
undermine Montezuma’s actual and perceived power.
Cortés claims that on November 14, 1519, he placed Montezuma under arrest,
which he justified because of an attack by the Mexica on the Totonacs and Spaniards near
Vera Cruz. The Totonacs had refused to pay their tribute to the Alliance, and the
Spaniards supported the decision. Taking the act as a sign of rebellion, a Mexica garrison
under orders of a nobleman attacked the Totonacs. Four Spaniards were killed, and the
head of one was sent to Tenochtitlan. The Mexica nobleman in charge of the province
was subsequently executed, which upset Cacama, tlatoani of Texcoco, because of the
growing influence of the Spaniards. Cortés and Montezuma working together invited
Cacama to Tenochtitlan and arrested him. From my own research, I have not found any
of these events mentioned in an indigenous account beyond that of the Ixtlilxochitl’s
Historia de la Nación Chichimeca, which was written about a century after the Conquest
as a testament to his Texcoco family’s unrewarded aid to the Spaniards in the Conquest.
It suffers from having a known prejudice against the Mexica.244 As previously
mentioned, Cortés’ claim that he had complete control until the “Noche Triste” has been
largely repudiated. Cortés’ political actions in his own letters were legal rhetoric to
explain his arrest of Montezuma as justifiable. Historian Francis Brooks believes that the
events in fact took place closer to May, and this might have played a part in Cortés
arresting Montezuma. Camilla Townsend sees as a desperate gamble by Cortés to
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maintain power after having overstayed his welcome and the arrival of Spaniards in April
to arrest him on behalf of Governor Velázquez.245
In mid-April, 1520, Pánfilo Narváez arrived off the coast of Vera Cruz with
around 900 men; this event made the situation more confusing for Montezuma.
Narváez’s goal was to arrest Cortés on behalf of Velázquez and take Cortés’ place in
Mexico. When Narváez landed, he made good relations with the Totonacs and publicly
denounced Cortés as a villain. He began a relay of messengers from the coast to
Montezuma himself. Narváez was granted permission to come to Tenochtitlan and was
given gifts and supplies. Montezuma finally told Cortés about his rival, and urged Cortés
to leave the city.246 Townsend argues that Cortés, desperate to maintain his position and
avoid an uprising, had to have “a gun to Montezuma’s head” to convince the newly
arrived Spaniards to join him.247
Native unrest was beginning to be felt by Cortés with the incidence among the
battle orchestrated with Totonacs and Cacama’s arrest. Attempting to quell native unrest,
Cortés arrested Montezuma. Afterward, Cortés set out for the coast in early May in order
to defeat Narváez. How he planned to do this with only 80 or so men and some
Tlaxcalans seems unknown. The remaining men were left under the charge of Pedro de
Alvarado. Narváez was situated in Cempoallan with all his men. Cortés sprung a
surprise attack against Narváez on the rainy night of May 28, 1520. Despite the disparity
of numbers, the attack was a success, and Cortés captured Narváez, who lost an eye and
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was slightly burned in the process.248 While Cortés’ fortunes improved, those of Pedro
de Alvarado’s had soured.
Before Cortés had left to intercept Narváez, Montezuma had asked permission to
hold the immensely important festival of Toxcatl. Cortés and Alvarado when asked
separately allowed it. However, Alvarado panicked at the sight of the bizarre preparation
of the festivities and had several Mexica tortured until they confessed to a plot against the
Spaniards. Tlaxcalan warriors further undermined his confidence. Around May 16,
1520, Alvarado, frightened at the sight of noblemen dancing in front of the great temple,
had the plaza closed off, and then slaughtered a hundred or so unarmed dancers as well as
those attending the festival. This night would not mimic Cholula as the Mexica rose in
arms against Alvarado and his men. Alvarado delayed direct conflict for a few days by
threatening to kill Montezuma. Still, Alvarado and his men were holed up in the palace
without food or means of escape. With over a thousand Spaniards and at least twice as
many Tlaxcalans, Cortés made haste to the city upon news of the uprising. Cortés arrived
on June 28, 1520, to a seemingly deserted Tenochtitlan; however, it became obvious after
four days that the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans were now trapped on the island city.249
After a few days, Cortés made a last ditch effort to escape. He forced Montezuma
to the roof of the palace where they were staying in. On the roof, protected by two
Spanish soldiers, Montezuma waved his hand for his fellow Mexica to stop yelling so
that he could speak.250 He told his people, “‘We are not the equals of [the Spaniards]!
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Let [the battle] be abandoned! Let the arrow, the shield be held back!’”251 The Mexica
shouted back that they had elected a new ruler, Cuithahuac, and fired bows and slings at
the soon to be former tlatoani. Montezuma was hit three times and quickly taken inside.
Wounded, he begged the Spaniards to kill him; before Cortés fled from the palace he did
just that. As the Spanish and Tlaxcalans fled on the night of June 30, 1520, Montezuma
and the noblemen who had stayed by his side were found by the vengeful Mexica,
already stabbed to death.252
Camilla Townsend views Montezuma’s plea for peace as his insight into the
military strength of the Spaniards, and the inevitability of the Spanish victory from his
ability to see the “longue durée.” This view is plausible as Montezuma’s emissaries had
watched Spaniards in battle coupled with the knowledge of that more Spaniards had
arrived. Montezuma might have realized that the Spanish weaponry and style of fighting
were superior to that of the Mexica. He might also have known that more Spaniards
could follow.253 Yet Narváez’s arrival was a strange happening that surprised Cortés who
told Montezuma he was not to be trusted, which Narváez also told Montezuma about
Cortés.
I believe that Montezuma was more worried that Tenochtitlan would be the next
Cholula. His great city had suffered a similar slaughter, which, according to the Codex
Aubin, Montezuma had been warned of when preparing for the festival. His nobles told
him they should hide weapons in case they were entrapped by the Spaniards like the
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Cholulans, to which Montezuma responded, “‘Are we among enemies? Disregard it.’”254
Whether or not this conversation occurred, Montezuma must have had the image of a
burning Tenochtitlan in his mind when he addressed the warriors crowding the palace
walls. At this point, there were even more Spaniards and Tlaxcalans in Tenochtitlan than
there had been in Cholula. The fighting and the massacre were both new for the citizens
of Tenochtitlan, who had lived in a city that stood out above all others as invulnerable. It
was also unheard of having elected a new tlatoani while another was still alive.255
Montezuma’s death by Spanish steel was an all too fitting end for a ruler who had been
actively attempting to consolidate his city’s control only to realize that he gave the
Tlaxcalans, the people he had been wearing down, the allies they needed to overthrow
their oppressor.
Even though Cortés had been allowed to return to Tenochtitlan after Alvarado
attacked the noblemen in the festival, there was no longer a doubt in any Mexica’s mind
that the Spaniards were enemies. Cortés had used his novelty to its fullest advantage, his
actions with the Totonacs, arresting the tax collectors and whitewashing a temple, were
forgiven. Montezuma brushed aside Cholula’s destruction because he could not stop him
from arriving, face him directly in battle, nor ignore Cortés’ constant insistence that he
was an ambassador. Montezuma had no choice but to allow him into the city because he
allowed him unchallenged to travel through the Empire itself. Retrospectively, it easy to
see that he should have immediately engaged Cortés, but Montezuma was a ruler of an
Empire who came from a culture that treated strangers kindly. Furthermore, Cortés was
an enigma claiming to be an ambassador. Despite the consequences of Montezuma’s
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decisions, it is difficult to say that they were based on naiveté or superstition. More
likely they were poor decisions based on novel circumstances.
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Chapter Six
The Fall of the Mexica
“Long live the emperor, our master! Spain forever! Tlascalla forever!”256

In this chapter I will now explore the clash of indigenous culture’s technology and
views of warfare with those of the Spaniards. The Mexica would face many problems
after the successful expulsion of the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans from Tenochtitlan. Cortés
and his army would officially merge aspirations with Tlaxcala. The Mexica and their
allies would be faced with new technologies, new diseases, but most importantly a
European view of warfare. Towards the end of the Conquest these were problems the
Mexica would face alone; for all intents and purposes the Triple Alliance was no more by
the time of the Siege of Tenochtitlan. The Spaniards and Tlaxcalans would replace the
violence that the Triple Alliance used to exert control over surrounding city-states with
their own, and, effectively, take the place of Alliance as the dominant power to ally to.
The final military clash of these cultures would occur where they began, in Tenochtitlan.
Leaving Montezuma and his advisors dead, Cortés and his army headed west for
the Tacuba Causeway in an effort to make it to the western shores of Lake Texcoco.
They left the palace at midnight on June 30, 1520; this night would be forever
remembered as “La Noche Triste,” the sorrowful night. The Spaniards were attacked
throughout the city as the headed to causeway. The causeway had been partly damaged
and its bridges removed by the Mexica to prevent escape from the island. The Spaniards
were attacked on all sides as canoes moved along with the caravan of soldiers packed
onto the causeway. Dead bodies filled up the holes of the bridges allowing the Spanish to
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walk across. Before making it to Tacuba, Cortés would lose 600 of his roughly 1,200
Spanish soldiers, thousands of Tlaxcalans, and seventy of his hundred horses.257 This
was the first battle the Mexica fought against the Spaniards, and it was an incredible
victory for them.
The expulsion of the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans, however, had cost the Mexica
more than just manpower and a tlatoani; it cost them their image as the dominant force in
the region. The Mexica in had held the overwhelming majority of power in the Triple
Alliance, which was keeping the Empire together. As Cortés and the Tlaxcalans retreated
to Tlaxcala, the window for the Mexica to maintain their control closed with them.
Mexica authority was in disarray, and it is common when a tlatoani dies that tributaries
attempt to rebel. Because of the events of Montezuma’s death, the temptation for citystates to rebel would have been even stronger. Cortés brutality toward Alliance towns
and cities would only worsen the situation.258 Cortés and the Tlaxcalans attacks on
surrounding city-states were not only playing on this weakness but also resulted in the
new dominating force and subjugating power in the Valley. In essence, Cortés and the
Tlaxcalans sapped power away from the Mexica by conquering their tributaries.
The goal of Cortés was not to crush Tenochtitlan, but to have it succumb to the
tactic of “example-at-a-distance,” that is, the sight of the destruction of the cities
surrounding Tenochtitlan would result in its surrender.259 Cortés, seeing the beauty of the
city of Tenochtitlan, which dwarfed any Spanish city, wanted to keep it intact through a
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siege to force submission.260 This would ultimately be an impossible goal; nevertheless,
Cortés, after destroying Tenochtitlan, finally forced the city to surrender on August 13,
1521. This would be the culmination of different views of war and weapons, disease as
well as the usurpation of power by Cortés and the Tlaxcalans, which disrupted the
Empire of the Triple Alliance. I will now briefly examine instances of how all these
factors they affected the Conquest.
The Mexica, along with their allies from Texcoco and Tacuba, had created a loose
knit empire built on passive rule of conquered city-states. Their conquests originally
focused on the Valley of Mexico, and all of their new subjects owed tribute as an
expression of the Alliance’s dominance. City-states closer to the Alliance owed
foodstuffs along with luxury items, this was especially true of cities along the southern
stretches of Lake Texcoco as well as cities on the other side of thee southern mountains
of the Valley. However, the farther the cities were from the Valley the more likely that
their tribute would be paid in luxury items or assistance in maintaining borders. As the
Empire expanded the nobility grew in size and wealth, and to some extent the lower
classes did too. Consequently, demand for luxury items also grew. In turn, select cities
focused on luxury craft specialists, while others turned to agriculture, and the Alliance
turned outward for raw materials. The pochteca, merchant class, expanded with the
Empire to new cities and areas. The Alliance sought to stabilize trade routes and increase
trade among regions to promote Mexica merchants.261
The control of the Alliance over tributaries was not always military; often it was
the projection of power. Certainly if a rebellious area rose against the Alliance and
260
261

Cortés, Letters From Mexico, 222-3.
Smith, The Aztecs, 56.
106

refused to pay tribute, they would be attacked and subjugated. An example of how this
fear instilled obedience can be seen when Cortés arrested the Mexica tax collectors. The
Totonacs, the natives living near Vera Cruz, feared far more from a reprisal by the
Mexica than Cortés, so they sent Cortés off against imaginary Mexica soldiers. Yet
Cortés’ immediate military presence began to change this view as the Totonacs sided
with him and aided him in his original journey to Tenochtitlan and fought with him
against the Tlaxcalans. Cortés’ military exploits would continue to damage this the image
of the powerful Mexica.
Another method used to maintain power by the Alliance when some territories
were difficult to conquer was to choke them off from trade and engage them in flowery
wars. These tactics sought to impoverish areas and drain them of their most confident
warriors. The Alliance used these strategies to win wars and minimize losses because
conquering difficult areas would be costly in terms of manpower and potentially weaken
the image of the Alliance’s strength. This was the fate of the Tlaxcalans, who were
confined by the Alliance and subject to indefinite war and poverty. 262 That is, until the
arrival of Cortés; the Spaniards were a volatile catalyst in this unstable system. They had
managed to bring a Tlaxcalan army to the heart of the Alliance, Tenochtitlan. Despite the
heavy losses from the Noche Triste were, at least a fifty percent casualty rate, the
Alliance was left in disarray.
The loss of Montezuma was disastrous for the Mexica because the election of a
new tlatoani was usually a time of uprisings where subjugated polities took advantage of
the change in leadership. The unprecedented circumstances of Cuithahuac’s election,
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Montezuma’s death, and the presence of a new power in the appearance of Cortés made
these uprisings more likely.263 However, to try to consolidate his power, Cuithahuac
followed the success of the Noche Triste by continuously attacking the Spaniards and
Tlaxcalans on their retreat to Tlaxcala. While Cortés’ numbers dwindled, the conflict
came to a head at the Battle of Otumba. Outside the city of Otumba, which was vital for
all things obsidian, the Spaniards, exhausted from their flight, met a large Mexica army.
The Mexica began the battle with the upper hand, well-rested men with high morale, and
the battle was going in their favor. In a last ditch attempt to swing the battle his way,
Cortés and five horsemen attacked what appeared to be the commanding officers of the
Mexica. The attack was a success, and Cortés and his men road back with the Mexica’s
banner in hand. Historian Hugh Thomas sees this as a moment where the lack of Mexica
organization was key; without the banner to direct soldiers, the Mexica fled in disarray.
To Thomas this is evidence of the power of horses to disrupt soldiers who had no
experience against cavalry.264
Inga Clendinnen, however, offers a very different and illuminating view on the
significance of the battle. Clendinnen writes that “the taking of a banner was to Indians
less a blow to collective pride than a statement: a sign that the battle was to go, indeed
had gone, against them.” When Cortés and his men killed and grabbed the banner of the
director of war, the Mexica saw it as a sign that the battle was lost. They were not
thrown into disarray but saw that the battle, which was a sacred contest, had shifted to the
Spaniards. Mesoamericans did not view war to be simply the conflict between two parties
but as a predetermined conflict in which they could foresee who the victor would be from
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subtle signs. The taking of the banner was one such sign.265 At Otumba, the warriors
were not, as Hugh Thomas claims, unorganized but in fact very well organized. However,
they believed that the battle was not theirs to win.
The assumption that warfare in Mesoamerica and Europe were fought with the
same beliefs was and has been a characteristic misconception by both Cortés and
subsequent scholars. Warfare in Mesoamerica was replete in rituals that were reflections
of cultural beliefs. As mentioned earlier, in Tenochtitlan there were schools established
for both the nobility and commoners where they learned the art of war. The nobility
received more training, especially with shock weapons such as the maquahuitl and the
tepoztopilli, and they did not use bows or slings in battle. The maquahuitl was the most
venerated weapon as it took the largest amount of training to use.266 The maquahuitl was
the same weapon used in the gladiatorial sacrifices where the captive’s obsidian blades
were removed while the captor used his fully functional maquahuitl to slowly slice the
captive. 267
Warfare was a highly organized affair. A battle began at a relatively close
distance of 50 to 60 meters; this distance might seem large, but in actuality
Mesoamerican bows and slings could fire farther, but effectiveness and accuracy of these
weapons would have been sacrificed. Arrows were standardized and bows had a range of
90 to 180 meters; slings threw standard size stones well over 200 meters. Projectile
weapons were associated with the lower classes, and the only projectile weapon the
nobility used was the atlatl, a spear or dart thrower, due to its association with the gods.
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An atlatl had an effective range of about 45 meters. Both atlatl darts and arrows were
fletched, standardized in length and weight, yet they could have a variety of points, from
fire hardened to obsidian tipped or even barbed. The atlatl was a medium ranged
weapon, which with rear support of bows and slings could disrupt the front of formations.
As long distance weapons depleted munitions, the formations closed and the front line
moved forward throwing darts from their atlatls. As lines closed in, elite warriors
switched to the highly regarded maquahuitl and novice nobility and commoners switched
to the tepoztopilli.268
The foremost soldiers were known as the cuahchicqueh; these soldiers were not
organized into units but in pairs meant to end the battle quickly, aid an ally under duress,
attack a retreating armies rearguard, or hold a position no matter the consequences.
Warrior units, comprised of soldiers ranking from novice to expert with a high status
veteran leading each individual unit, followed the cuahchicqueh. Units were highly
organized and veterans were meant to aid novices. The units moved together and
maintained careful cohesion with ranks closing in as soldiers died or were captured. In
fact breaking rank for an unwarranted reason or defying command was punished with
death. Orderliness prevented enemies from pushing into the ranks and lessened the
confusion of retreat. If an enemy was too strong the units would retreat and projectiles
would resume. If all went well in battle, soldiers and units stayed together, pushed
forward, and attempted to surround an enemy.269
As a person rose in rank so did his attire and privileges, providing a social
incentive to combat. The number of captives and brave deeds achieved in battle
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promoted one’s rank; anyone was eligible for promotion, but the process favored nobles
because they were better trained and armed than commoners. Soldiers did not try to kill
their enemy but rather to wound and disable him, so that he could be captured as a
sacrificial victim. Warriors did not always capture an enemy because some were able to
escape or they fought to their death rather than being taken, which seen more honorable.
Ones military rank depended not only from the number of captives taken, but the citystate they were from. In fact, warfare was so strongly tied to status that even a tlatoani
would enter combat with his generals surrounding him.270 Cuithahuac was absent from
the battle of Otumba, so this must have made the loss even more humiliating to the
Mexica, who desperately needed to show old allies that their new tlatoani was a capable
leader.271
Otumba was not just a battle but also a sacred duel among warriors. The battle
followed the traditional Mesoamerican view of war, likely beginning, as was customary,
at dawn. The Mexica followed their traditional loose formation of a two-meter or so
distance between one another, so that the warriors could pair off with infantryman.272
This positioning would allow a warrior to parry the Spanish infantryman and try to slice
him with his maquahuitl or tepoztopilli. However, the effectiveness of these weapons
would be compromised if the Spaniards wore any metal armor. Nonetheless, they
persisted with their tradition of fighting and indeed, tried to capture Spaniards as this
style of fighting was ingrained in them. The Mexica fought valiantly for hours, and the
battle was going their way. Yet seeing their banner waving as Cortés galloped back to
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his line, so did, in their eyes, the favor of battle. Throughout the Conquest, Spanish
banner carriers remained significant targets, yet the Spaniards’ obliviousness towards
their loss must have been frustrating to the Mexica. Clendinnen notes that this traditional
view of war changed as the Mexica realized the Spaniards did not heed signs so obvious
to the Mexica.273
The Mexica had continued the tradition of reinforcing control and forging
alliances. However, after the loss at Otumba the Mexica feebly tried to gain support
through gift giving.274 The Mexica were so desperate after Otumba that they failed to
make a bargain with the Tlaxcalans to kill the Spaniards. The Tlaxcalans, too, continued
to view alliances and war in traditional terms seen in their rejection of the Mexica’s offer
and requested for an alliance with Cortés. The Tlaxcalans demanded traditional
conditions: to be given control of Cholula, have a Tlaxcalan manned fortress in the heart
of Tenochtitlan, to be given a fair share of spoils, and not to have to pay tribute to
whoever ruled Tenochtitlan after it was conquered. The Spaniards did not stay true to
their word.275
Mexica attitudes towards warfare, despite how ingrained they were, did adapt to
the Spaniards’ tactics, but this would occur after an outbreak of smallpox that ravaged all
of Mexico following the “Campaign of Tepeaca.” Tlaxcalans put forth the idea to siege
Tepeaca, which was a hub for tributary items before being brought to Tenochtitlan. This
campaign was really a series of slaughters. The city of Tepeaca, itself, refused to
succumb and fought Cortés, but other towns willingly surrendered. In one instance
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Cortés’ men rode up to a group of warriors outside their walled city ready to do battle,
but the fighters were dissuaded from fighting, laid down their arms, and brought to speak
with Cortés. Cortés had all the men executed and their families enslaved.276
It was traditional in Mesoamerica that defending armies would not engage an
army, especially if they knew they were not likely to win. A traditional sign of
submission and acknowledged defeat was for an army to literally lay down their arms.
Historian Ross Hassig notes that “expectations of victory and defeat played a significant
part in Mesoamerican warfare.” A town or city that expected to lose would surrender in
order to minimize losses both in manpower and goods as submission without conflict was
rewarded with lesser tribute demands. The Spaniards, however, did not recognize the
cultural subtleties of Mesoamerican warfare, which led to bloodier conflicts.277 Cortés,
likely, understood acts of blatant submission, but knew that violence was a universal
language, writing to his king, “we always routed them and killed many […] we had
pacified and subdued many towns and villages and the lords and chieftains had come
forward and offered themselves as His Majesty’s vassals.”278 As the Campaign ended,
the native people of Mexico were visited by an even more horrific plague than Cortés,
smallpox.
Disease, while it did not weaken the empire in terms of manpower, it did shift
politics of the Alliance and gave extra support and time to Cortés. Disease, when
mentioned with the conquest, is often seen as the factor that left the Mexica in huddling
masses that Cortés swept down upon and conquered. This is not the case, but it did
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indeed favor Cortés for political reasons. Smallpox spread throughout the Mesoamerica
from a sick slave named Francisco de Eguía, who beyond having the misfortune of being
a slave is also the known source of smallpox on the Americas’ mainland. From him the
disease spread to the Totonacs and followed the Spaniards’ path of conquest. It swept
through the Valley northwestward and arrived at Tenochtitlan in October of 1520. The
disease killed many; estimates of infected populations range from loosing a third to a half
of their original size. This is partially from being a naïve population, a group of people
who have never been afflicted with a disease before, but also because of how native
peoples sought to heal ailments and lack of care for the sick. All indigenous remedies for
skin ailments involved bathing and breaking of blisters, and both would spread this
disease.279 280 This obviously affected all indigenous peoples equally; however, the
Spaniards, despite some of their own soldiers being sick, were spared fatalities. This is
attributed to their inherited and acquired immunity, the latter from when they were
children.281
The impact of the smallpox epidemic on the conquest has been the subject of
much debate. Camilla Townsend views disease as having little effect on the outcome of
the Conquest.282 Inga Clendinnen is largely in agreement and notes that while the
Mexica did view ailments as the cause of gods, they did not associate Spanish related
events and smallpox in the Florentine Codex.283 I myself have been unable to find any
connection of the smallpox outbreak in relation to the Spaniards, who are not mentioned
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as being spared by nor the cause of the epidemic. In fact, in the chapter of the Florentine
Codex that discusses the outbreak, the smallpox epidemic is immediately followed by
how the Mexica soldiers recovered enough to leave the city. And “the brave warriors
[the Mexica] came following after them [the Spaniards]. None of the Mexicans died.
Then the Spaniards turned their backs.”284 If the Mexica saw the disease as punishment
and the Spaniards as divine they certainly did not show it. The peoples of the Triple
Alliance would have been well aware that both allies and enemies of the Spaniards were
suffering.
Nevertheless, the contrarian argument lingers despite the lack of evidence to
support it; William H. McNeill laid out the typical argument more than thirty years ago.
He argued that, since both the Spaniards and Mesoamericans were very religious, “from
the Amerindian point of view, stunned acquiescence in Spanish superiority was the only
possible response.” And that “the gods of the Aztecs as much as the God of the
Christians seemed to agree that the white newcomers had divine approval for all they
did.”285 The Spaniards certainly felt this way about the latter statement – with one
conquistador writing, “When the Christians were exhausted from war, God saw fit to
send the Indians smallpox.” Yet Amerindians seem silent on both assertions.
Furthermore, there is an account that, after the Conquest of Mexico, the Zapotecs, about
400 km south of Tenochtitlan, reverted back to their “idolatry” believing the outbreak of
smallpox was punishment by their old gods for converting to Catholicism.286 There is
also no Spanish account of natives viewing or even implying disease was an act of any
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god(s) favoring the Spaniards. Yet this view persisted in the European mind; when, half
a century later, an epidemic in Mexico combined with the defeat of Spanish Armada led
Philip II to ban writing in indigenous languages, thinking these events were God’s
punishment to the Spanish Empire.287 Despite the lack of indigenous sources viewing
disease as proof of European exceptionalism, many scholars perpetuate this belief,
including Jared Diamond and Alfred Crosby.288289
Perhaps this argument stems from the zealotry, flagrant among both Spaniards
and Mesoamericans, and the fact that after the outbreak Cortés, literally, became a
kingmaker. The epidemic raged for about sixty days and killed almost every important
leader around: Cuithahuac, tlatoani of Tenochtitlan, the tlatoani of Tacuba, the tlatoani
of Cholula, and the tlatoani of Tlaxcala amongst many others.290291 Cortés appointed
new tlatoani of the latter two cities, among others. Bernal Diaz reports that when Cortés
was asked who should be the new tlatoani he “made a point of nominating those who had
the best claim.” Often these were the sons of the previous rulers, whether or not they
were fit to actually rule.292 Cortés appointed the sons of the previous tlatoani for both
Tlaxcala and Cholula; the latter being a twelve-year-old boy.293294 Cortés was
unaccustomed to indigenous politics and was unaware that a council appointed a new
tlatoani, so Cortés likely went by the European assumption that a king was determined by
primogeniture.
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Part of Montezuma’s tightening of the Empire’s control over tributaries had been
the replacement of troublesome rulers with puppet ones. Yet city-states in and
surrounding the Valley of Mexico had willingly become more subordinate towards the
Empire because it offered stability for the area.295 In effect Cortés had disrupted Valley
politics dramatically by undoing this stability; this made Cortés the power to seek both
safety under and from. Since his expulsion from Tenochtitlan, Cortés had begun a
campaign against anyone who was not on his side. This increasingly made being an ally
of the Triple Alliance a liability. The sudden loss of leaders of almost every city through
smallpox was further impetus to side with Cortés and the Tlaxcalans. Cortés was a stable
leader when compared to the Mexica, who had lost Montezuma, most if not all of his
council during the Noche Triste, and countless nobles as well as Cuithahuac from
smallpox.
When the outbreak subsided, the Mexica then elected Cuauhtémoc, their final
tlatoani. Scholar Manuel Aguilar-Moreno believes that had he been elected instead of
Cuithahuac the Mexica could have defeated Cortés and the Tlaxcalans.296 Even so,
Cuauhtémoc was newly appointed, and his ability to rule was untested. As stated, the
beginning of new reigns was a traditional time of revolt for city-states, underscoring a
city-states’ desire to seek approval from Cortés and to be spared any further destruction
by him. Deaths from disease and the resulting chaotic change in Mexica leadership were
smallpox’s most useful effects for the Spaniards.
Cortés began his campaign into the Valley of Mexico itself on December 31,
1520. On that day, Cortés arrived unharmed in the city of Texcoco, situated comfortably
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on the western shores of its namesake lake. The Triple Alliance no longer existed.297
Why the tlatoani of Texcoco sided with Cortés remains unknown but perhaps he had a
falling out with Cuauhtémoc. From here Cortés made various excursions around the lake,
conquering either by force or by immediate surrender. Occasionally the Mexica would
chastise cities for switching sides, but in reality, neither the Mexica nor the Spaniards and
Tlaxcalans had enough forces to maintain allegiance. Both sides depended on a display
of power to keep the fidelity of towns and cities. The vacillation of alliances continued
until the Spaniards permanently conquered the southern lakes after razing the city of
Tepotzlan. Surrounding city-states surrendered and supported the Spaniards. Then, on
May 26, 1521 Tenochtitlan suffered a serious blow with the severing of its aqueduct.298
Cortés had with him ninety cavalrymen, 120 crossbowmen and harquebusiers, 700
infantrymen, three large cannons, and fifteen small cannons dispersed unequally on his
thirteen brigantines.299
From this point it has become, retrospectively, an inevitability that the technology
savvy Spaniards were destined to win as they indeed would. However, the average
Mesoamerican and Mexica warriors were not so easy to conquer and were adaptable to
the new technological threats posed by the well-armed Spaniard. Much of the Mexica’s
adaptation dealt with their view of war rather than any technological deficiency. As
stated before, Mexica combat was at its best a one-on-one predetermined contest between
evenly matched warriors. There was no stigma in dying in combat in any type of warfare
in the Mesoamerican mind; dying in war was referred to as the “flowery death,” and it
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was honorable to die spread-eagled and sacrificed. Dying in a gladiatorial fight, if you
fought well enough and injured or killed your captor, could give you fame even as the
opponent’s swordsmanship slowly “striped” you until you were sacrificed.300
This view of combat was alien to the Spaniards, who did not understand its procedures or
its meaning. The gladiatorial sacrifice was meant to stripe a victim slowly and carefully;
the obsidian blades could cut deep, but the captor did not. Instead the captor cut
delicately in order to display his ability as a warrior and by extension his status in society.
Inga Clendinnen views the Florentine Codex’s thorough account of the Spaniards killing
nobles before the “Noche Triste” as an attempt to understand how they used their swords
and why the Spaniards would inflict devastating rather than debilitating wounds.301 See
fig. 12. Similarly, on any battlefield, a Mesoamerican warrior attempted to disable his
opponent, not kill him. An opponent that realized capture was imminent would choose
the flowery death on the battlefield over capture. In fact, it was considered shameful if a
captive was freed and not sacrificed.302
The Mexica began to realize that the Spaniards were not worthy of sacrifice; they
fought as cowards, killing from a distance with European arms. This shift is seen in how
captured Spaniards were dispatched; early on, captives from the Noche Triste would be
placed under the sacrificial knife. Towards the end of the Conquest, when the Siege of
Tenochtitlan was well under way, Spaniards were killed in the most disgraceful way.
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Spaniards would be stripped of their armor and clothes, and the back of their heads would
be beaten in. This was a death reserved for disobedient slaves.303
These differences became clear during the constant skirmishes for dominance
along the lakeshore. In one instance two elite warriors stepped forth and challenged
Cortés to an equal fight; Cortés sent two cavalrymen at the warriors. One warrior,
wielding his maquahuitl, cut the charging horses legs and then its neck as it fell to the
ground. Fearing for his riders, Cortés had a cannon shot at the whole unit of opposing
warriors. The two horsemen lived.304 There is another account where a Mexica warrior
could not be subdued by three or four horsemen, and, after catching a lance thrown at him
by a cavalryman, he defended himself for another hour until he was shot twice by a
crossbow and then stabbed to death. These accounts show the Mexica warriors as
incredibly brave and adaptable. Despite this being the first war in which Mesoamericans
fought cavalrymen, they routinely grabbed lances from riders.305 See fig. 13.
The European measure of success in battle by casualty count was nowhere to be
found within the Mesoamerican culture of warfare. Despite this, Mexica warriors did
adapt to all the new threats of European warfare remarkably fast and as best as they
could. The Mexica despised the crossbowmen, harquebusiers, and cannons not only
because of their effectiveness, which they acknowledged, but also because of the lowly
way they were used to disrupt the sacred contest of war. Commoners killed at a distance.
Mesoamerican battle formations were traditionally loose and good for equally armed
enemies but not suited for Spanish cavalry. Mesoamerican battle formation did not
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change because a tight formation would have taken too much time to retrain soldiers, and
a tight formation would have provided better targets for cannons and harquebusiers.
Mexica soldiers learned to duck and dodge on open field battles. Knowing that they
lacked the advantage on open and even terrain, the Mexica adopted the tactic of retreating
to towns or ravines where they were on a more equal fighting level. The Mexica also
constructed pits filled with sharpened sticks to trap horses and enemy soldiers. These
changes also extended into the lake as canoes learned to zigzag from cannon fire, and the
Mexica successfully trapped two of Cortés brigantines.306307
The Mexica did attempt to use the weapons of Spaniards; they used captured
pikes and turned swords into lances. They used these to attack horses, especially from
below. They saw that horses could be frightened away by a barrage of projectiles. The
Mexica forced captive Spaniards to show them how to use crossbows. At one point, a
Mexica unit surprised a cannon squad, and pushed it into the lake.308 It is difficult to
gauge the effectiveness of Mesoamerican weapons on Spaniards. I mentioned before that
the tepoztopilli was so effective it pierced Bernal Diaz’s steel armor and it was only
stopped by his cotton armor underneath. Diaz also mentioned how effective arrows were
at penetrating the thickest cotton armor and that some Amerindians could fire three
arrows at a time very effectively. Diaz viewed the sling as the most effective enemy
projectile because it could wound even the best-armored Spaniard.309 Yet no information
on the effectiveness of obsidian weapons against metal armor is known, and historian’s
claims are based on assumptions. However, if Diaz was not exaggerating about the
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tepoztopilli there should be some attention paid to obsidian weaponry, perhaps using
experimental archeology.
Possibly what saved the Spaniards was the Mexica preference for disabling their
enemies rather than killing them. Ross Hassig and Inga Clendinnen agree that had the
Mexica originally fought to kill, uninhibited by their social construct of warfare, the
Mexica or the Tlaxcalans could have defeated the Spaniards.310 The Mexica soldier did
not compromise on taking captives as a means of status until the end when they marked
their hatred by subjecting Spaniards to the death reserved for slaves. The Mexica only
understood this when it was too late, when they realized that Cortés was not fighting
them to win battles but to begin an unconscionable act, a siege. As Clendinnen puts it,
“For the Mexica, siege was the antithesis of war.” A siege was slowly killing an enemy
by having their resources dwindle, to the point that starvation forced the enemy to
surrender. For the Mexica, a siege was not sacred combat between equals.311 Even Hugh
Thomas remarks that part of Cortés’ decision to lay siege was to prevent loss of Spanish
lives in direct combat.312
Ultimately, the Mexica realized that Cortés’ campaigns around the lake were part
of a plan to encircle them and cut off their food supplies. This is why the southern
shores, which produced most of their food, were the last to be under Cortés’ control. The
Mexica even realized the importance of their aqueduct, but that, too, was unsuccessfully
defended and severed.313 The siege formally began on May 13, 1521 when Cortés
divided his forces and attacked Tenochtitlan from the north, south, and east. With his
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brigantines, Cortés controlled both the lake and the land around the causeways that led to
the city. The city was cut off from water and food, unless canoes could make it past the
embargo and smuggle in supplies.
Siege was not an entirely foreign concept to Mesoamerica, but Cortés’ was. For
example, during Montezuma II’s campaign to control the areas that possessed the sand so
valuable to his lapidaries, he came against the walled city of Quetzaltepec. It was rare
that towns had walls; more often they had small fortresses for their women and children
to retreat to.314 Montezuma used a common strategy in which “many ladders were to be
made so the soldiers could climb the walls and many wooden digging sticks were to be
prepared in order to dig into the adobe and thus destroy the walls.” The people of
Quetzaltepec expected this and covered the edges of the walls with planks and the tops
with sharp stones, while men kept guard should any climbing be attempted. However,
the next day the Quetzaltepec army came out, and was defeated by Montezuma’s armies.
They retreated inside the multi-walled city and refused to submit. Montezuma had the
planks torn down and his men dig through every wall until they reached the city. By this
time, its inhabitants fled, and Montezuma burned the temple. Seeing their city being
sacked and their temple burning, the nobles of Quetzaltepec sued for peace and the
looting was stopped. According to Durán’s account, these actions lasted not much longer
than a week.315
The siege of Tenochtitlan was more sever than that of Quetzaltepec. Water was
cut off, food supplies dwindled, and Cortés was slowly killing everyone. During the
battles along the causeways the Mexica captured and killed several banner carriers, but
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the Spaniards kept coming. Seeing the Spaniards continually ignore the “signs” of battle
combined with the siege, the Mexica’s view of war had finally changed.316 The Mexica
sent the skin and skulls of dead Spaniards and horses to cities along the shore. This was
certainly an act of psychological warfare, but it was also a show of defiance that the
Mexica would not surrender.317 How could they? They were not allowed a fair fight as
the Spaniards sought to starve them to death rather than to do battle. Instead of warrior
vs. warrior, maquahuitl vs. sword, it was cannon and famine vs. Tenochtitlan.
Even though Cortés did not want to, because of the Mexica’s determination, he
had the city burned by brigantines.318 The Mexica fought valiantly and with fortitude at
every causeway and in the water. At night they launched surprise attacks, which they
normally regarded as deceitful. But Cortés had innumerable allies to keep the attack
going and to fill in the perpetual holes of the causeway made by the Mexica. Cortés and
his men would attack the same causeway day after day slowly gaining ground. By the
end of June, 1521, Cortés men had begun camping in the city itself. Even still, in early
July Cortés suffered a dramatic defeat where almost sixty Spaniards were killed in
addition to over 2,000 indigenous allies. This was when Cuauhtémoc sent body parts to
cities.319
The Mexica’s last attempt to stave off defeat is described in the Florentine Codex.
Cuauhtémoc had the Mexica’s best warrior dressed in “quetzal-owl armor,” which had
been the armor of Cuauhtémoc’s father, Ahuitzotl – the famed ruler preceding
Montezuma. They gave this warrior the xiuhcoatl, Huitzilopochtli’s legendary fire316
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serpent atlatl. He was sent into battle, and Cuauhtémoc and his council decided that if he
struck “one or two of [their] foes” Huitzilopochtli was still with them. So the quetzal-owl
went forward and terrified the Spaniards and their allies. The four soldiers who
accompanied him took three captives. The next day there was no fighting, but that night
a small “meteor” crashed onto the island city, and “the blazing coal broke into many
pieces” and fell into lake.320321 The Spaniards recorded neither of these events. Inga
Clendinnen views the meteor as story constructed after the Conquest to justify the end of
the city.322 This is likely the case as the city was, according to legend, to have grown out
of a heart thrown into the lake by Mexica priest as directed by Huitzilopochtli.323
Likewise, Huitzilopochtli would need to signal the death of the city, and his message of a
“bloodstone” falling on the city and quenching itself in the water was an obvious sign to
the Mexica.
Cuauhtémoc refused Cortés’ peace offerings believing him to be untrustworthy.
Although the accounts differ, on the day of the quetzal-owl warrior, Cortés says the
Spaniards and the Tlaxcalans pushed into the last Mexica stronghold. The Tlaxcalans,
whose forces Cortés estimated at 150,000, were ruthless, and Cortés told King Charles V,
“forty-thousand were killed or taken that day.” Cortés was grateful to get away from the
“stench of the dead bodies.” The day following the fabled meteorite, Cortés and his allies
forced the Mexica onto the chinampas, and trying to escape, they “drowned amid the
multitude of corpses.” Cortés estimates another 50,000 died. Cuauhtémoc, however,
escaped in a fleet of canoes, but was intercepted by the brigantines and brought to Cortés.
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“Speaking in his language,” Cuauhtémoc told Cortés he had done his duty as tlatoani and
placing “his hand upon” Cortés’ dagger asked that he be killed. Cortés declined and told
him “he need fear nothing,” so Cuauhtémoc was denied his flowery death. The siege
ended on August 13, 1521 after seventy-six days of fighting.324
Cortés likely exaggerated both the number of Tlaxcalans and the number of
Mexica killed (those figures alone would have been almost the entire population after the
smallpox epidemic). Their violence, however, was not exaggerated. Inga Clendinnen
views the intense violence and hatred the Tlaxcalans exhibited in sacking the city as
uncommon even for a land that routinely held human sacrifice. The Tlaxcalans had been
left unconquered and unincorporated in the Alliance’s Empire. For decades the Mexica
subjected the Tlaxcalans to flowery war, outright conquests, and Montezuma II had
begun a campaign isolating them from trade. This hatred had built up and the Spaniards
were the means by which the Tlaxcalans could unleash their hatred of the Mexica.
Clendinnen views this hatred as stemming from the Empire’s need for contest, which was
actualized through their flowery wars with Tlaxcala. The other city-states watched from
afar, disgusted by these disgraceful tactics; only the Tlaxcalans went into the city with the
Spaniards.325
But Clendinnen exaggerates the violence of the Tlaxcalans’ break from traditional
view of war. There are numerous accounts of the Triple Alliance’s forces slaughtering
whole cities. Ross Hassig has convincingly showed that the flower war’s etiquette was a
symptom of the Empire’s chronic rebellions and need to save manpower while displaying
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strength.326 However, Clendinnen is correct about the pent up violence the Tlaxcalans
sought to afflict upon the Mexica. Cortés had come to Mesoamerica at a crucial time for
the Mexica, who were trying to consolidate their control on their empire. Cortés
weakened the powerful city of Tenochtitlan by killing its nobles and their tlatoani inside
the city itself, and by violently imposing his power on every town he passed through.
Cuithahuac failed to defeat Cortés at Otumba and failed to actively defend the
towns and cities Cortés harassed afterward. Disease exacerbated the situation, as Cortés
was one of the few leaders the epidemic did not effect. Indigenous leaders subsequently
flocked to Cortés. Cuauhtémoc showed little power beyond offering gifts to cities, and
by the time he did begin using brutality, Cortés had already begun encircling the city.
Cortés was vicious and effective; he cut off traditional tribute not only from outside the
Valley of Mexico but even from within. To the Tlaxcalans, Cortés had led by example,
and viewing themselves as equal partners, they acted as they saw fit. Only Cortés and his
small group of Spaniards understood what the results of the Conquest would mean. It is
easy to look back retrospectively and chastise the Tlaxcalans for their naiveté, but they
were used to a very different understanding of how events would proceed after victory.
Cortés found the Tlaxcalans even more to his advantage than his guns and germs.
For there were several occasions where the Spaniards could have been defeated despite
their advantages: at Otumba, at Tlaxcala after the Noche Triste, and before they had
originally entered Tenochtitlan. What kept Cortés alive were the Tlaxcalans, who saw a
rogue agent unbound by any known rules of engagement. The Mexica, on the other hand,
had to gauge the novel situation in terms of political and military costs that could
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dramatically shift the dynamic of their Empire. Cortés only had to worry about staying
alive; promises meant little for his post-victory aspirations. Scholar after scholar has
noted that had the Mexica sought to kill in combat, they could have defeated the
Spaniards. But to the Mexica it would have been a hollow victory. They fought as they
had been taught for generations: in battle, one displayed his skill as a warrior in order to
capture victims for Huitzilopochtli, who needed blood and hearts to continue his daily
battle through the sky.
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Conclusion

As I have shown, the peoples of Mesoamerica had established a unique society
based both around their environment and culture. Their flora and fauna were different
from those of Eurasia, so subsequently they developed different methods of agriculture.
Theirs more closely mimicked natural cycles, best seen in the three sisters. A maize stalk
functioned as a pole for beans, which rejuvenated the soil, and the large, low growing
squash leaves covered the ground conserving moisture and protecting the roots of the
beans and maize. Even though Mesoamericans lacked large domesticated animals, which
may have contributed to their “failure” to progress in metallurgy, they developed as their
culture desired to without them.
Before the conquest and before smallpox, Tenochtitlan was one of the largest
cities in the world, built of stone and wood. While a driving force of Eurasian metallurgy
may have been weaponry, the availability of obsidian, which produced a sharper edge
than any Eurasian metal, gave the Mexica not only a weapon, but also a spiritual material
that as their culture developed became inseparable from everyday life.
The Mexica and the peoples of Mesoamerica had a sophisticated societies, with
complex trade routes, productive agriculture, and well-organized social structures. Their
culture was by no means perfect, but it was no worse than the Spain’s Inquisition or
Spanish rule in the Caribbean. The ultimate question addressed in this thesis is not a
comparison of moral superiority of one society over the other, but the fundamental causes
that led to the destruction of a Mesoamerican society by Cortés and his army. It was to
examine whether or not the it was the development of guns, germs, and steel an ocean
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away were the determining factors. Rather, I have aimed to show that it was a
combination of a multitude of both external and internal factors that led to the fall of the
Mexica and the Triple Alliance’s Empire. I have tried to show it was truly a conquest by
Hernán Cortés and the Tlaxcalans.
Yet the Conquest of Mexico is often used as one of the examples of the
inevitability of European conquest during the Age of Exploration and afterward. Cortés’
conquest, from a glance, epitomizes and validates this misconception. Cortés with a few
hundred Spaniards and a dozen or so cavalrymen, all clad in their state of the art armor
and wielding the most advanced arms – steel swords, crossbows, guns, and even cannons
– conquered the entire Triple Alliance’s empire within a mere two years. New additions
to this story have added some more truth with people thinking Cortés arrived, disease
spread and killed, and he conquered. Even when the version acknowledges the aid of
indigenous allies, the story is still seen as the inevitability of European dominance. Inga
Clendinnen even mentions that when scholars discuss the Conquest of Mexico they often
stop after the Noche Triste as if after this point there was nothing the Triple Alliance
could have done to prevent defeat.327
However, this is not the case, and I believe that if there was one singular instance
where the tides of war shifted in Cortés’ favor it was the Battle of Otumba. Cortés had
suffered devastating losses from the Noche Triste, and he was under constant attack by
small bands of soldiers while he retreated to Tlaxcala. Morale was low, most of his men
were injured, and they were outnumbered by the Alliance’s army whose morale was high.
The battle was going in the Alliance’s favor, and then Cortés and a few cavalrymen flew
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through the loose ranks of Alliance soldiers and killed the banner carrier. Had the
Mexica and their allies remained undeterred by these events they would likely have won
the battle. Instead they dispersed; this is the Conquest of Mexico’s Gettysburg.
Afterward, the Mexica were so desperate that they sent emissaries to intercept Cortés’
and the Tlaxcalans return to Tlaxcala. The Mexica pleaded for the Tlaxcalans to betray
the Spaniards and kill them.
The Tlaxcalans could not have seen this act as anything other than an obvious
sign of how weak the Triple Alliance was at that moment. The Tlaxcalans fought bitterly
for decades to remain independent of the Empire, and in return the Empire cut off their
trade connections and relentlessly fought them in flowery and combative wars. The
Tlaxcalans knew that Cortés was their chance to take the battle from Tlaxcala to the
Alliance’s territories. They already had a taste of retribution with the destruction and
massacre of Cholula. Now they took war to into the Alliance’s territory as Cortés began
his Campaign of Tepeaca. The Alliance by not having finished Cortés at Otumba
allowed him to recover and begin campaigns in the eastern provinces of the Empire.
It is after this point that the outcome of the Conquest can be seen as an
inevitability, but only because of the Alliance’s inaction. Cuithahuac was an ineffective
leader who, for unknown reasons, did not partake in the Battle of Otumba. If he had
showed more fortitude by participating, which was not unheard of, it is possible the
Triple Alliance’s army would not have lost their confidence as easily. Even afterwards
Cuithahuac leadership proved ineffective as he failed to fight Cortés in Tepeaca. The
subsequent outbreak of smallpox rather than contributing to the Mexica’s decline may
have been fortuitous as it took the life of Cuithahuac and allowed for the ascendance of
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Cuauhtémoc. Yet Cuauhtémoc’s elevation to tlatoani was too little, too late. By this
time the confidence and the perceived power of the Triple Alliance and of the
indomitable Mexica were in tatters, forestalling any help that might have come from
vacillating neighboring city-states. This is most clearly seen in Texcoco’s welcoming of
Cortés in December of 1520.
Not only had Cortés entered the Valley of Mexico unhindered, but also the
Mexica’s most important and longest standing ally had welcomed him. Texcoco was the
Mexica’s most important ally in its war for independence, yet even they sided with
Cortés. The city of Texcoco became an important area for Cortés to launch attacks on the
other city-states along Lake Texcoco that remained aligned with the Mexica. It was also
in Texcoco where Cortés built and launched his brigantines. And it was in Texcoco
where Cortés finally set out to lay siege to Tenochtitlan. However, the Mexica and their
remaining allies fought valiantly until the end at the siege and destruction of
Tenochtitlan. Cuauhtémoc’s determination and political leadership was likely the
strongest factor of the tenacity that kept the Tenochtitlan going for so long.
Nevertheless, Cuauhtémoc was captured as his city was destroyed and sacked,
and the Tlaxcalans slaughtered his surviving, starving people. Still he had lasted for
seventy-six days, but on August 13, 1521 he surrendered to Cortés and begged for death.
Instead Cortés lied to him saying, “He need fear nothing.” Cuauhtémoc was later
tortured in an attempt to find out where the tlatoani’s hidden treasure was; whether or not
it existed, Cuauhtémoc never said anything. In 1525 Cortés took Cuauhtémoc with him
on a campaign in Honduras. Cortés feared that the Mexica and other natives of the
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former Empire might rise again if Cuauhtémoc remained alone. In Honduras
Cuauhtémoc was executed by hanging for charges of conspiracy against the Crown.328
The defeat of the Triple Alliance, which was largely the defeat of the Mexica
people, was a complicated matter. Technology, disease, and the instability of the Empire
itself were all factors in the Empire’s quick collapse. However, it seems that the largest
factor was a combination of cultural differences in societal organization and particularly
in areas of diplomacy and warfare. Before Cortés arrival Montezuma II struggled to
reconcile the tenacity of the Tlaxcalans and to maintain the traditional means of power of
conquered areas. His bureaucratization of the Empire and dividing it into distinct
provinces might have eventually made it into a cohesive state rather than a grouping of
conquered city-states that acknowledged Alliance dominance by yearly payments.
However, Tlaxcala remained stubbornly out of his grasp, which he attempted to chip
away until it too could be incorporated into the Empire.
I find Montezuma to be the biggest loser in the Conquest of Mexico. He
attempted to reform the way in which the Empire functioned and curb the religious and
social motivations for individuals to go to war. He is invariably considered cruel in all
the native sources written after the Mexica’s fall. These have left him an unworthy
legacy. This hatred stems from his failure to stop the Conquest, to stop the Spaniards.
Indigenous histories show him as an incapable leader who failed in war and stifled social
mobility. However, what Montezuma’s policies were actually doing was attempting to
dampen the constant uprisings, which made the Empire unstable. He did tighten social
mobility, but in order to slow down the internal drive for warfare. Today he is seen as a
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classical example of an ineffectual leader, who did not act, obvious to us now, when he
should have. A leader, so stupid, that he believed Cortés to be the god Quetzalcoatl,
returning to claim power.
Montezuma believing Cortés to be Quetzalcoatl is one of the most popular myths
of the conquest. It fits in so well with explaining how an outsider marched into the heart
of an empire and tore it asunder. It fits nicely with the belief that he accomplished this
act with guns, germs, steel, and European ingenuity. Cortés is believed to have been the
master Renaissance Machiavellian (despite The Prince being published after the
conquest) who arrived on the New World’s shores in a suit of armor that might as well
have been a space suit. The story is romantic in its ideas and its assumption. It is a story
of how various European factors were decisive in destroying Tenochtitlan. However,
Cortés was, from as soon as he landed off the shores of the Triple Alliance’s Empire,
supported by thousands of Amerindians, including, at first, Montezuma, who followed
the native custom of treating ambassadors well.
The army of Cortés may have been fronted by Spaniards, but was
overwhelmingly made up of Mesoamericans. These people fought for him, provided him
food, shelter, and information. He relied on Malintzin, who is now viewed in Mexico as
a traitor, to translate and on the Tlaxcalans to finally conquer Tenochtitlan. European
technology played an important role, but many of these were factors that, at the time,
could have been overcome by the sheer numbers of Amerindians facing the barrel of his
harquebusiers and cannons. It is difficult to decide which technology aided Cortés the
most, if it was his cannons or the brigantines. It was not just European technology and
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indigenous support that led Cortés to win. Perhaps the overriding factor was the differing
views of warfare between the indigenous peoples and the Spaniards.
Warfare as a religious and sacred contest was ingrained in Mesoamerican
cultures. It was not only acts of trying to take captives, although that certainly saved
many Spaniards lives, but also the indigenous belief that warfare should be a contest
between equals in hand-to-hand combat. It was predetermined, but for man to undertake
to find out who was the winner. Projectile weaponry that Cortés relied on was seen as
cowardly, so, too, was the act of siege. But Cortés saw warfare as a European, as body
counts and territory gained or lost.329 The differences in not only technology but also the
concept of warfare were shaped by the environments that fostered the two cultures.
Ultimately, Mesoamerica developed a culture within a very different set of
parameters than Eurasia. This led to its own advances and discoveries, but these did not
stack up to an inevitable set of outcomes. There were chances for the Triple Alliance to
win, but it came down to human decisions that were shaped by their judgment, which is
arguably the most basic influence of a culture. These choices unfortunately led to the
destruction of a magnificent city, but it was also the beginning of the painful experience
from which Mexico would rise; the beginning of the syncretism of Mesoamerican and
Iberian cultures.
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Terms and Definitions*
Alcohua: The Ethnic group that constituted the city-state Texcoco.
Amaranth: A type of herb whose seeds were collected as food.
Atlatl: Spear thrower.
Aztlan: The mythical home of the Mexica.
Azcapotzalco: The capital of the Tepanec Empire on the western shores of Lake Texcoco.
Aztec: A modern term derived from the Mexica’s mythical homeland Aztlan.
Bernal Diaz del Castillo: Wrote an important memoir on the Conquest of Mexico. Bernal
Diaz had participated in all three expeditions to Mexico. His memoir is an invaluable
primary source about the Spaniards experience during the Conquest of Mexico. It was
written when he was over seventy years old and was meant to correct incorrect
accounts of what happened (Aguilar-Moreno 25-6).
Calmeca: A school for nobility and priests who were better taught than the commoners in
matters relating to warfare, history, and religion.
Calpulli (pl. calpullin): Essentially like a kinship group with its own internal
stratifications ranging from commoners to elected leaders.
Chalachiuitl: Nahuatl for Emerald.
Chia: A type of sage.
Chichimecs: Supra-ethnic group of Northwestern Mexico, they were considered
uncivilized.
Chiconaui itzcuintli: One of the four gods of the lapidaries.
Chimpalpopoca: The tlatoani of Tenochtitlan and ruled from 1417-26.
Chinampa: Known as floating islands; they are actually artificial islands made in shallow
lakes used for agriculture.
Cholula: A major and old city-state just outside the Valley of Mexico.
Chontal Mayan: A dialect of Mayan common in the Yucatán Peninsula.
Cinteotl: Was one of the gods who created the lapidary crafts; he is also the god of Maize
(Aguilar-Moreno 148).
Cronica X: Is a lost history of the Mexica. It is believed to have been written by a native
in Nahuatl and with pictographs. It was used by Durán and other chroniclers (Thomas
781).
Codex Aubin: Is codex dated to 1576 and is in the style of an indigenous history. It is a
“screenfold” and is a “collection of Mexican testimonies” dealing with the departure of
Aztlan to the Conquest (Thomas 776).
Codex Mendoza: Is an indigenous primary source; it is pictographic history with Spanish
notes that contains a history of the Mexica, a list of tribute of what each tributary owed,
and some glimpses of what life was like in the Valley of Mexico (Thomas 778-9).
Cuitatl: Nahuatl for excrement.
Cuztic teocuitlatl: Nahuatl for gold.
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Florentine Codex: Is a twelve volume “ethnography” written by Fray Bernardino de
Sahagún. It was written in Nahuatl and used natives who were alive during the
Conquest of Mexico as its sources. He began the work in 1547 (Thomas 777). It is
arguably the most important primary source on the Mexica.
Fray Bernardino de Sahagún: Was a Franciscan monk stationed in Mexico City who
compiled and wrote the Florentine Codex. He was born in Spain in 1499 and sent to
Mexico in 1529 (Aguilar-Moreno 24).
Fray Diego Durán: Was a Dominican monk who entered into order in 1556. Although he
grew up in Texcoco, he was born in Seville in 1537. He is the author of various
important primary sources on the Mexica: The Book of the Gods and Rites, The Ancient
Calendar, and The History of the Indies of New Spain. (Aguilar-Moreno 25, Thomas
781).
Gerónimo de Aguilar: A Spaniard who was captured by Chontal Mayans and
subsequently became fluent in the language. He would be used to translate with
Malintzin.
Governor Velázquez: was the governor of Cuba at the time of the Conquest and funded
Cortés’ expedition.
Harquebus: A musket common during the time of the Conquest.
History of the Indies of New Spain: Is an invaluable primary source on the written by
Dominican Fray Diego Durán. Durán used the “Crónica X,” native accounts from all
ages and ethnic groups. The Historia is one of three works by Durán and was published
in 1581 (Aguilar-Moreno 25, Thomas 781). See also Fray Diego Durán.
Huexotzinca: An ethnic group from outside of the Valley of Mexico.
Huitzilopochtli: The main god of the Mexica of Tenochtitlan. He was their warrior sun
god who required daily human sacrifice to sustain him. He is a mix of the gods
Tonatiuh and Tezcatlipoca.
Iztac teocuitatl: Nahuatl for silver.
Itzcoatl: The tlatoani of Tenochtitlan and ruled from 1427-40.
Itztli: Nahuatl for obsidian.
Ixtlilxochitl: The tlatoani of Texcoco
Lake Chalco: The southernmost lake in the Valley of Mexico.
Lake Texcoco: The largest lake in the lake system of the Valley of Mexico. The island
that Tenochtitlan was founded on is on the western side of the lake.
Lake Xaltocan: The lake between Lakes Zumpango and Texcoco.
Lake Xochimilco: The lake between Lakes Texcoco and Chalco; it had highly productive
chinampas.
Lake Zumpango: The northernmost lake in the Valley of Mexico.
Letters From Mexico: Is a compilation of letters written by Cortés during the conquest as
means to justify his actions in disobeying Governor Velázquez and found La Villa Rica
de Vera Cruz. (Translated and edited by Anthony Pagden xix-xx).
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Macuilcalli: One of the four gods who created the lapidary crafts.
Malintzin: Cortés Nahuatl translator. Also known commonly as La Malinche.
Maquahuitl: A Mesoamerican weapon in the shape of cricket paddle lined with obsidian
blades.
Mayeque: Non-Mexica serfs.
Maxtla: Tlatoani of Azcapotzalco ruled from 1427-9 (Aguilar-Moreno xii).
The Memoirs of the Conquistador Bernal Diaz del Castillo: See Bernal Diaz del Castillo.
Metzcuitlatl: Nahuatl for mica.
Meztli: Nahuatl for moon.
Mexica: The name of ethnic group inhabiting Tenochtitlan, commonly known today as
the Aztecs.
Milpa: A style of intercropping, or a term for a maize field.
Mirror Stone: Was a mirror created from either obsidian or pyrite which divination like
powers and was associated with the god Tezcatlipoca.
Montezuma I (Montezuma Ilhuicamina): The tlatoani of Tenochtitlan from 1440-69.
Nahua: A term used to describe speakers of Nahuatl and is used similarly to an ethnic
group.
Nahuatl: The language of the Nahuas including the Mexica.
Naualpilli: One of the four gods who created lapidary crafts.
Neçoliztli: A Nahuatl term for a form of bloodletting by cutting one’s lips or earlobes.
Obsidian: A volcanic glass.
Olmec: Is considered to be the “mother” culture for all of Mesoamerica. The civilization
existed from around 1200-800 BCE near modern Veracruz (Aguilar-Moreno 7-8).
Ometeotl: A Mesoamerican hermaphroditic god who birthed the four Tezcatlipocas.
Otumba: A small city-state located near the a gray source of obsidian but better known
for its specialized craft production.
Pachuca: A town located near a important source of high-quality green obsidian.
Pánfilo Narváez: A Spaniard sent to Mexico to arrest Hernán Cortés.
Pipiltin: Essentially a Nahuatl term for the noble class.
Quetzalcoatl: One of the oldest gods in Mesoamerican mythology. His name translates to
“feathered serpent.” He is responsible for creating and destroying various worlds. He is
also the god of wind and of knowledge (Aguilar-Moreno 149-50). A post conquest
myth asserts that Montezuma thought that Cortés was Quetzalcoatl returning to take
power.
Tecpatl: Nahuatl for flint or sacrificial knife. Also a minor deity.
Tarascan Empire: An empire neighboring the northwestern portion of the Triple
Alliance’s
Empire.
Telpochcalli: A Mexica school for commoners to learn basic military skills, history, and
religion.
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Telpochtli: A cult for young warriors who worshiped Tezcatlipoca.
Tentitzania: Nahuatl verb that means to sacrifice and cut ones lips for the idols.
Tenitztic: Nahuatl, translates to “something sharp or which has a cutting edge.”
Tenitzticayotl: Nahuatl word that translates to “edge, or sharpness of a knife, etc.”
Tenochtitlan: The capital city of the Mexica.
Teosinte: The wild ancestor of modern maize.
Teotihuaca: Remnant people in the Valley of Mexico from the collapse of the
Teotihuacan Empire around 750 CE.
Teotihuacan: A major city and established around 100 BCE and lasted until 750 CE
(Aguilar-Moreno 11-3).
Tepanecs: an ethnic group ruling from Azcapotzalco the capital of the Tepanec empire,
on the western shores of Lake Texcoco.
Tepoztopilli: A Mesoamerican lance or spear whose head was brimmed with obsidian
blades.
Tetl: Nahuatl for stone.
Texcoco: City-state of the Alcohua, and a member of the Triple Alliance.
Tezcatl: Nahuatl for mirror or mirror stone. See also mirror stone.
Tezcatlipoca: One of the four sons of Ometeotl, the creator god. Tezcatlipoca holds a
complicated place in the Mesoamerican Pantheon. He has created and destroyed
various worlds.
Tezozomoc: The tlatoani of Azcapotzalco, succeeded by Maxtla in 1417 (AguilarMoreno xii).
Tlacaelel: The nephew of Itzcoatl, and the half-brother of Montezuma I. He was an
important advisor to both Itzcoatl and Montezuma I.
Tlacopan: A Tepanec city-state that was part of the Triple Alliance. Also known as
Tacuba.
Tlahuahuanaliztli: Is the form of sacrifice that translates to “gladiatorial sacrifice.”
Tlatoani: The ruler of a city-state elected by the nobility (pipiltin) or a previous tlatoani’s
council and can be equated to a king.
Tlaxcala: A city-state outside the Valley of Mexico
Tlaxcalan: A native of Tlaxcala.
Toltecs: The previous civilization in habiting the Valley of Mexico centered in the citystate of Tula. The Toltecs lasted from circa 900-1150CE. (Aguilar-Moreno 16-7).
Tonatiuh: A sun god dating back to the Toltecs, circa 950 CE.
Totonacs: A Mesoamerican ethnic group that lived along the Gulf Coast.
Triple Alliance: Triumvirate alliance between the three city-states that formed it:
Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan. The empire they created is often referred to the
Aztec Empire.
Tzintzuntzan: The capital city of the Tarascan Empire. See also Tarascan Empire.
Xipe Totec: Mesoamerican god of agriculture and goldsmiths (Aguilar-Moreno 151).
Xiuhcoatl: Huitzilopochtli’s serpent atlatl.
Xiuitl: Nahuatl for Turquoise.
* I have listed sources only for any information not previously cited within the body of
the work.
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Maps

Map 1: The extent of Mesoamerica. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997), 6.
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Map 2: The Triple Alliance’s Empire including ethnic enclaves. Source: Alan Knight, Mexico
from the Beginning to the Spanish Conquest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
132.
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Map 3: A map of the Valley of Mexico. Source: Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in
the Aztec World (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 57.
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Map 4: City-states’ territories in the Valley of Mexico. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs
(Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 168.
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Map 5.1, 5.2: Tenochtitlan (above and below). Source: Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central
America: Archaeology and Culture History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 509, 447.
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Map 6: Obsidian sources near the Valley of Mexico. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden:
Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 10.

Map 7. Obsidian Sources of Mesoamerica. Source: Kenneth Hirth, “Craft Production in a Central
Mexican Marketplace,” Ancient Mesoamerica Vol. 20, No. 1, (Spring 2009), 90.
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Map 8: Route of Hernán Cortés. Source: Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America:
Archaeology and Culture History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 527.

146

Figures

Figure 1: Chronology and Genealogy of the Tlatoani of Tenochtitlan. Manuel Aguilar-Moreno,
Handbook to Life in the Aztec World (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 38.
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Figure 2: Human Sacrifice depicted in the Codex Magliabechiano. Source: Susan Toby Evans, Ancient
Mexico & Central America: Archaeology and Culture History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 504.
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Figure 3: A page from the Codex Mendoza depicting tribute owed to the Triple Alliance. Source: Frances
F. Berdan and Patricia Rieff Anawalt, The Essential Codex Mendoza (Berkley: University of California
Press, 1997), Folio 31r, pp. 67.
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Figure 4.1, 4.2: Chinampa structure (above) and planting from the Florentine Codex (below). Source:
Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America: Archaeology and Culture History (London:
Thames & Hudson, 2004), 444, 464.
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Figure 5: Precious stones and obsidian mirror. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the
Things of New Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, XI: illustrations, 772-786.
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Figure 6: Gladiatorial Sacrifice. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of New
Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, IX: illustrations, 1-12.
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Figure 7: Warriors with tepoztopilli. Source: Frances F. Berdan and Patricia Rieff Anawalt, The Essential
Codex Mendoza (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997), Folio 67r, pp. 139.

Figure 8: Obsidian tool and jewelry production. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: Blackwell
Publishers, 1997), 110.
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Figure 9: A drawing of the maquahuitl and tepoztopilli that were destroyed in the fire of the Royal Spanish
Armory in 1884. Source: Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control, (Norman:
University of Oklahoma, 1995), 82.
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Figure 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3: Tecpatl effigy knives (top), obsidian ear spools (middle), obsidian lip plug
(bottom). Source: Eduardos Matos Moctezuma and Felipe Solís Olguín, Aztecs (London: Royal Academy
of the Arts, 2002), 255, 313.
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Figure 11.1, 11.2: The Eagle Warrior effigy sacrificial knife (above) and the Tonatiuh sacrificial knife with
Huitzilopochtli’s xiuhcoatl at the end of the handle (below). Source: Eduardos Matos Moctezuma and
Felipe Solís Olguín, Aztecs (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2002), 232, 328.
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Figure 12: Massacre of nobles in Tenochtitlan. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the
Things of New Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, XII: illustrations, 65-72.
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Figure 13: The siege of Tenochtitlan. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of
New Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, IX: illustrations, 119-127.
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